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Although ASEAN has an impressive record toward a consolidating regional 
organization, the analysis on the creation of regional nuclear energy governance is 
rarely examined. The existing scholarship mainly focus on the role and functions of 
its nuclear weapon-free zone, so-called SEANWFZ. Apart from the emphasis on 
SEANWFZ, most of academic works consider the relationship between nuclear issue 
and strategic threats, including non-proliferation and terrorism. While some shed 
light on the policies and energy demands of a specific ASEAN country. This study 
takes on exploratory case studies as its main method. Main sources of this research 
are from academic articles, ASEAN documents, website on the international 
organizations related to nuclear 3s, and online news. This work will also employ the 
interviews with the policymakers who are relevant to the political processes led to 
the establishment of the ASEANTOM. This research found that the ASEANTOM 
took place based on the three factors: Thailand’s leadership, global and regional 
norms, and ASEAN member countries’ preferences. It also complements the existing 
explanation by arguing that ASEAN has been taking a Globalist approach, which 
refers to ASEAN’s preferences toward global norms on nuclear non-proliferation 
and energy issues. 
 
Keywords: ASEANTOM, regional cooperation, institutional design, nuclear 
energy, nuclear governance, ASEAN 
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 ASEAN, as a regional grouping, has a long history of institutional 
development. Since its beginning in 1967, ASEAN has been evolving under the 
changing international environment. During the Cold War, ASEAN was successful 
in managing the external powers in order to maintain its neutrality and centrality. 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN proceeded with fast-pacing development. For 
example, ASEAN expanded its member states to ten in 1997. Moreover, it played a 
vital role in bringing China, Japan, and South Korea to disseminate the future of the 
region at its forums, particularly APT and EAS. An important hallmark for the 
institutionalization of ASEAN is the ratification of the ASEAN Charter and the 
leaders’ efforts to establish the ASEAN Community by the end of 2015. 
 
 At the global level, almost all ASEAN countries ratified and acceded to the 
NPT during 1970s-1980s.1 In addition to the NPT, most of them have been the 
parties of several global nuclear regimes, including the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification 
of a Nuclear Accident, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, and so on. They also 
submitted the reports following to the agreements of the UNSC Resolution 1540, 
closing the opportunity of non-state actors to acquire any materials having potential 
for the weapons of mass destruction. At the regional level, all ASEAN countries 
ratified the SEANWFZ or Bangkok Treaty, the first and only one regional treaty on 
nuclear governance in 1995. Besides, the ASEAN leaders agreed to continue their 
commitments to maintain the region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction as clearly stated in the Article 1 (3.) of the ASEAN Charter.2 
1 Myanmar was the last ASEAN country to accede the NPT in 1992. 
2 “Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” ASEAN Secretariat, accessed 
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 At the national level, ASEAN countries had records of nuclear-related 
activities since 1960s. Four ASEAN countries consisting of Thailand, Viet Nam, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, operated their nuclear research reactors.3 Among these 
four countries, the Philippines was the only one having plan to construct a nuclear 
power plant. However, it had to prolong the plan for two times due to concerns over 
nuclear safety and security after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident in 1979 and 
the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident in 1986.4 The consequence is similar when there 
was the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011. ASEAN countries decided to delay 
their plans and set up the first regional mechanism on nuclear 3s (safeguards, safety, 
and security), even if there is a dire need for energy security of each country. 
 
 To promote nuclear energy security, ASEAN and its dialogue partners 
countries agreed to cooperate “for the development and use of civilian nuclear 
power” by ensuring the nuclear 3s. 5  Following to the ASEAN Declaration on 
Environmental Sustainability, ASEAN countries concurred on the establishment of 
“a regional nuclear safety regime” in order to reinforce a regional cooperation on 
information sharing, technical exchanges, and capacity building for peaceful use of 
nuclear technology, particularly for power generation purpose. 6  The AMEM 
corresponded to these visions by assigning the senior energy officials to work out on 
May 26, 2019, 3, https://asean.org/asean/asean-charter/charter-of-the-association-of-
southeast-asian-nations/. 
3 Nur Azha Putra, “The dynamics of nuclear energy among ASEAN member states,” Energy 
Procedia no. 143 (2017): 586-88. This order follows the chronology of the country who 
built the reactors first. 
4 Putra, “The dynamics of nuclear energy,” 587. 
5 “Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment,” ASEAN 
Secretariat, accessed May 26, 2019, https://asean.org/?static_post=singapore-declaration-
on-climate-change-energy-and-the-environment. 
6 “ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability,” ASEAN Secretariat, accessed 
May 26, 2019, https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-environmental-




                                                          
the Terms of References and configuration of this regional entity.7 The First and 
Special Meetings of the NEC-SSN took place in Singapore in January and May 2008. 
The process of negotiating and drafting the Term of References finally ended in 
2011, which marked the First Annual Meeting of the NEC-SSN as well. 
 
 In the same year of the First Annual Meeting of the NEC-SSN, ASEAN 
discussed the idea of creating a regional entity to reinforce nuclear 3s in the region 
as a response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in March. The OAP arranged the 
international conference to celebrate its own golden jubilee to assess the situation of 
nuclear energy in ASEAN as well as to collect some policy recommendations from 
other countries. The senior officials related to the issue drafted the concept paper in 
2012. The Prime Minister of Thailand at that time proposed the idea to the 20th 
ASEAN Summit with positive responses from other member countries. The officials 
disseminated the Term of References for one year (2012-2013). The First Annual 
Meeting of ASEANTOM took place in 2013 with the main objective to formulate 
the work plan of the network. 
 
 Although ASEAN has an impressive record toward a consolidating regional 
organization, the analysis on the creation of regional nuclear governance is rarely 
examined. The existing scholarship mainly focus on the role and functions of 
SEANWFZ. For instance, Bilveer Singh’s report offers an overarching analysis on 
the political process that led to the ratification of the SEANWFZ Treaty with the 
emphasis on the role of external powers and internal players.8 However, his study 
ended up at the year 2000 before the new round of the NPT Review Conference. 
7 “Joint Ministerial Statement the 25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) 
“Energising ASEAN to Power a Dynamic Asia” Singapore, 23 August 2007,” ASEAN 
Secretariat, accessed May 26, 2019, https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-ministerial-
statement-the-25th-asean-ministers-on-energy-meeting-amem-energising-asean-to-power-a-
dynamic-asia-singapore-23-august-2007. 
8 Bilveer Singh, ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the challenge 
of denuclearisation in Southeast Asia: problems and prospects, Canberra papers on strategy 
and defence; no. 138, (Canberra: Australian National University, 2000). 
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Apart from the emphasis on SEANWFZ, most of academic works consider the 
relationship between nuclear issue and strategic threats, including non-proliferation 
and terrorism. While some shed light on the policies and energy demands of a 
specific ASEAN country.9 
 
 The objectives of this research are two-folds. First of all, it narrows a gap of 
academic literature on regional nuclear energy governance. This work analyzes a 
topic that has been overlooked in the study of historical and institutional 
development in ASEAN. It also aims to expand the knowledge on international 
cooperation and nuclear energy security by providing an in-depth analysis of the case 
study of ASEAN. This research found that the ASEANTOM took place based on the 
three factors: Thailand’s leadership, global and regional norms, and ASEAN 
member countries’ preferences. It also complements the existing explanation by 
arguing that ASEAN has been taking a Globalist approach, which refers to ASEAN’s 
preferences toward global norms on nuclear non-proliferation and energy issues. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2-1. The role and functions of SEANWFZ 
 
 A number of academic literature on the regional governance on nuclear 
energy in ASEAN mainly focus on the evolution, characteristics, and challenges of 
SEANWFZ. Seminal works on international cooperation and nuclear issues deem 
SEANWFZ a case study of regional nuclear weapon-free zones.10 They briefly 
9  “ B a c k g r o u n d , ”  A S E A N T O M ,  a c c e s s e d  M a y  2 6 ,  2 0 1 9 , 
http://122.155.190.95/aseantom5/index.php/about-us-2/. 
10 Susan Burk, “Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones,” in Routledge Handbook of Nuclear 
Proliferation and Policy, eds. Joseph F. Pilat and Nathan E. Busch (New York: Routledge, 
2015), 310-311; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly 
Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second Edition, (Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 34; Michael Hamel-Green, “Nuclear-
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explained the evolution of the treaty that the two treaties, Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, 
inspired the establishment of the nuclear weapon-free zone in the Southeast Asian 
region. SEANWFZ derives from the declaration of ZOPFAN in 1971, as an attempt 
to centralize its regional organization among the competition of great powers in the 
region. They also referred to the fact that all NWS are still hanging on the ratification 
of the Treaty until the time of writing.11 Given the fact that no NWS signed the 
Treaty, Graham justified SEANWFZ as a “failure.”12 
 
 The second scheme indicates political and legal implications of the 
SEANWFZ Treaty to ASEAN countries. Acharya and Boutin reflected some 
concerns of the U.S. and China on the application of the Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs). The U.S. expressed its anxiety over the limitations of its military presence 
in the region. While being a party of SEANWFZ might affect China’s ability to 
exercise its nuclear and military escalation.13 Regarding the legal perspective of 
SEANWFZ, Kittichaisaree argued that the Treaty along with TAC and 1982 
UNCLOS could be constructive tools in managing the conflict in the South China 
Sea due to its provisions. He also pointed out similar concerns addressed by NWS 
as key obstacles of the implementation.14  
 
Weapon-Free Zone Developments in Asia: Problems and Prospects,” Global Change, Peace 
& Security 17, no. 3 (2005): 240-242; Michael Hamel-Green, “Cooperation Regionally, 
Denuclearizing Globally: Multilateral Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Initiatives,” in 
International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Georgia: 
University of Georgia Press, 2016), 206-228; Nguyen Hong Thao, “Asia-Pacific Moving 
towards the Ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” East Asian 
Observer 11 (2018): 465-475. 
11 Burk, “Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones,” 311. 
12  Thomas Graham, Jr., The Alternate Route: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, (Corvallis, 
Oregon: Oregon State University Press, 2017), 104. 
13 Amitav Acharya and J. D. Kenneth Boutin, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone Treaty,” Security Dialogue 29, no. 2 (1998): 220-224. 
14 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, “A Code of Conduct for Human and Regional Security Around 
the South China Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law 32, no. 2 (2001): 135-36. 
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 An additional sort of literature pays attention to the role of SEANWFZ in 
historical and institutional development of ASEAN. Acharya and Weatherbee saw 
SEANWFZ as a tiny step toward the establishment of a security community in the 
region.15 Ba considered SEANWFZ a significant effort to strengthen the relevance 
of ASEAN to negotiate global and regional issues such as nuclear proliferation. The 
process of working together within and beyond the region to implement SEANWFZ 
stipulated the diplomatic style of ASEAN to accommodate the interests of different 
actors. In addition, this treaty is a symbol of the idea “One Southeast Asia” because 
it was the first treaty that was signed by all ASEAN member countries.16 
 
 A thorough analysis about the prelude to the signing of SEANWFZ is 
Bilveer Singh’s. 17  His work investigated the attitude and policies of ASEAN 
countries toward nuclear proliferation and regional cooperation under the framework 
of SEANWFZ. Although his report has further details, his conclusion sounds similar 
to the abovementioned literature. He stated that ASEAN countries had positive 
attitude toward the nuclear non-proliferation even if some countries intended to 
accelerate their nuclear capabilities. Besides, ASEAN countries were able to 
compromise between NWS’ interests and internal security distress such as the issues 
of Nuclear Security Assurances (NSAs) and the South China Sea. 
 
 Concerning the aftermaths of SEANWFZ, Abad’s article analyzed the 
strategic significance of SEANWFZ in the first decade after the ratification. Abad 
mapped out the new strategic environment in Southeast Asia by stating three aspects, 
including new dynamics of regionalism, increasing number of agreements to reduce 
15 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order, Third Edition, (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), 171; 
Donald K. Weatherbee International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for 
Autonomy, Second Edition, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009, 105. 
16 Alice D. Ba, (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 187-
88. 
17 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,”. 
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nuclear arms race, external nuclear threats (the cases of India-Pakistan and North 
Korea), and international terrorism. 18  SEANWFZ is relevant to these changing 
strategic conditions, mainly because it keeps the member states in check for ensuring 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It also supports the confidence-building 
and cooperative activities in the region.19 
 
2-2. Nuclear as a regional issue in ASEAN 
 
 Abad’s work provides a linkage to another theme of academic literature on 
the regional nuclear issues in ASEAN, which is nuclear and its implications to non-
traditional security issues. Ogilvie-White investigated the connection between global 
non-proliferation and each member states’ obligations in counter-terrorism, 
particularly the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540. She argued that the perception 
gap between ASEAN-style and West-centric threatens the governance on nuclear 
non-proliferation in the region because the global practices overlooked the 
adaptation to local norms. Moreover, the success of ASEAN in enhancing 
confidence and regional cooperation had been rather bilateral and multi-lateral than 
regional one.20 
 
 Conversely, Malley reoriented the trend of the study on nuclear issues in 
ASEAN by questioning the possibility of nuclear proliferation in ASEAN as the 
study on the relationship between nuclear proliferation and regional security is 
underexplored. ASEAN countries had no incentives and capabilities to develop their 
nuclear weapons because there was no immediate threat to the region.21 In his article, 
18 M C Abad Jr., “A Nuclear Weapon-Free Southeast Asia and its Continuing Strategic 
Significance,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 171-72. 
19 Abad Jr., “A Nuclear Weapon-Free,” 177-78. 
20 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Non-proliferation and Counter-terrorism Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia: Meeting Global Obligations through Regional Security Architectures?,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (2006): 1-26. 
21 Michael S. Malley, “Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in Southeast Asia, 2006-2016,” 
Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (2006): 606-7. 
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Malley explored two cases: Myanmar and Indonesia. For the case of Myanmar, the 
possibility of nuclear proliferation derived from increasing isolation and financial 
resources, and its proximity to North Korea. While the case of Indonesia was 
different as Indonesia was a country with a profile of compliance to international 
agreements and its intention for peaceful use of nuclear energy.22 
 
 An additional trend of the study on nuclear issues in ASEAN pays attention 
to nuclear and energy security. Symon indicated emerging energy challenges 
triggering the calculation of energy security in the region. Interestingly, nuclear 
energy was nothing new as some countries had attempted to develop their nuclear 
capabilities for research and electricity during the 1960s. In his article, Symon 
introduced the country plans and proposals of five ASEAN countries, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Apart from his 
analysis, he proposed the idea of “ASEAN Nuclear Energy Commission” as a policy 
to maintain regional nuclear order. According to Symon, this organization is at best 
to be a broker dealing with nuclear plant dealers, who are mostly international 
companies, in order to ensure the compliance of ASEAN member states with 
international agreements.23 
 
 Nuclear energy has been a dominant topic in the study of nuclear order in 
ASEAN. Several articles in the series “Asia’s Energy Trends and Developments” 
contributed to the progress of nuclear energy in ASEAN with a special focus on an 
individual country. Radiman unveiled an ambition of the Malaysian government at 
that time to attain “nuclear power status” and set up its nuclear power plants by 
2021.24 While Prasetijo stressed on a necessary electricity demand that would lead 
22 Malley, “Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation,” 610-12. 
23 Andrew Symon, “Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN’s Effectiveness 
to the Test?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 1 (2008): 133. 
24 Shahidan Radiman, “Malaysian Perspectives, Planning and Problems with Regard to 
Nuclear Energy,” in Asia’s Energy Trends and Developments Volume 1: Innovations and 
Alternative Energy Supplies eds. Mark Hong and Amy Lugg (Singapore: World Scientific, 
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Indonesia to perform with large scale power plants. He also discuss the development 
of Indonesia’s nuclear industry and its readiness of infrastructure for the assessment 
by IAEA.25 
 
 Dalpino and Westmeyer’s is a recent work providing a comprehensive 
review of each country’s stance toward nuclear issues (except Viet Nam). The 
authors explored the motivations of ASEAN countries to acquire nuclear energy. 
They argued that ASEAN countries had continuously been taking “Globalist” 
approach, which means ASEAN countries prefer regional ways to promote peace 
and security and actively support the existing international regimes on both nuclear 
non-proliferation and nuclear security, concerning the nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy issue.26 
 
 According to them, there are three main drivers behind the path toward 
regional security in ASEAN. First of all, ASEAN countries put forth energy security 
as their priorities. Second, many ASEAN statements referred “the need for clean 
energy” as their efforts to tackle the climate change. The last is historical factor. 
ASEAN experienced the intervention of external powers during the colonial and 
Cold War periods. Therefore, the acquisition of nuclear was related to the national 
survival and prestige. Nonetheless, ASEAN countries were successful in dealing 
with those powers, ASEAN would not move toward a robust regional nuclear energy 
and non-proliferation mechanism. This article also bring domestic civil society as an 
important determinant of the procrastination of nuclear energy development.27 
2013), 205-213. 
25 Djoko Prasetijo, “Power Development Plan and Status of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
Development in Indonesia,” in Asia’s Energy Trends and Developments Volume 1: 
Innovations and Alternative Energy Supplies eds. Mark Hong and Amy Lugg (Singapore: 
World Scientific, 2013), 179-192. 
26 Catharin Dalpino and Timothy Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia: A Measured Nuclear Policy,” 
in Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes eds. Mike M. 





                                                          
 
2-3. Regional institution on nuclear energy governance in ASEAN 
 
 The two categories share some similar features. First of all, they focus on a 
specific issue such as the role and functions of SEANWFZ or terrorism or energy 
security without any causal linkages to the preceding or following phenomenon. 
Second, the two categories reflect academic trends at the time of their writings. 
According to my personal observation, the analyses on SEANWFZ were written 
during 1990s-2000s while the scholarship on nuclear and terrorism issue in ASEAN 
were written mainly 2005 afterwards. This trend is also similar to the studies of 
nuclear and energy security being presented frequently after 2008. However, these 
two groups lack of the analysis on the formation of regional governance on nuclear 
energy in ASEAN. 
 
 Finally, each category portraits slightly homogeneous argument and unit of 
analysis. The first category on the role and functions of SEANWFZ emphasizes the 
autonomy of ASEAN to resist the external influence as well as positive contribution 
of the regional norms in maintaining the harmony within the region. While the 
second category pays attention to the relationship between ASEAN regional 
arrangements and individual ASEAN country on counter-terrorism and energy 
security. Many works weigh domestic processes as the key component to the 
development of regional nuclear order in ASEAN. 
 
 In this sub-section, the author identifies the last scheme of scholarship, 
mainly focusing on the regional governance and its key components. Delfin 
proposed three key drivers behind ASEAN countries’ decisions to go for nuclear 
power: energy concerns, environmental concerns, and ASEAN’s participation in 
global regimes on nuclear issues. He also outlined a timeline for the institutional 
development of NEC-SSN with further discussion on its challenges, particularly its 
10 
 
intertwining functions with IAEA and the willingness of ASEAN countries to 
promulgate regional standards.28 
 
 Caballero-Anthony and Trajano argued that this incident did not affect the 
decision of some member states to acquire nuclear energy. However, they suggested 
that those countries should take into consideration some serious issues such as the 
regulative frameworks, nuclear safety, emergency planning, and physical protection. 
At the end of the article, they proposed some policy recommendations to foster 
regional cooperative actions through ASEAN mechanisms, including NEC-SSN and 
ASEANTOM. 29  However, these two works did not analyze the key factors or 
sources that influenced the creation of regional governance on nuclear energy in 
ASEAN. 
 
 Wan’s work examining regional pathways toward nuclear non-proliferation 
and nuclear regime is a recent work talking about the ASEANTOM as a part of his 
chapter on Southeast Asia. Generally, this book challenges the existing academic 
works on international cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation by using region as 
a unit of analysis. Wan explored all regional nuclear weapon-free zones and regional 
organizations, including Africa, Western Europe, Latin America, Middle East, 
Northeast Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. His key argument is these regional 
mechanisms positively contributed to the global disarmament and non-proliferation 
efforts. They could play a role to supplement the coherence and robustness of the 
global NPT.30 
28 Francisco G. Delfin, Jr., “Birthing ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation Regime: Drivers, 
Status and Way Forward,” in Asia’s Energy Trends and Developments Volume 1: Innovations 
and Alternative Energy Supplies eds. Mark Hong and Amy Lugg (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2013), 237-249. 
29 Mely Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano, “Enhancing nuclear energy 
cooperation in ASEAN: Regional norms and challenges,” in Learning from Fukushima: 
Nuclear Power in East Asia eds. Peter Van Ness and Mel Gurtov (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 2017), 187-218. 
30 Wilfred Wan, Regional Pathways to Nuclear Nonproliferation, (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2018), 3. 
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 For the case of Southeast Asia, Wan pointed out that regional nuclear order 
in ASEAN is based on SEANWFZ. However, it is not a single source for nuclear 
non-proliferation in the region. He also stated the security environment that had been 
free of direct nuclear threats as well as the attempts of ASEAN member countries to 
institutionalize regional mechanisms since the signing of ASEAN Declaration in 
1967. New regionalism focusing on economic cooperation reoriented the policy 
priority of ASEAN to economic cooperation. Although some countries have plans 
to develop nuclear technology for securing its energy security, this will not bring 
about the path toward nuclear weapons. Wan also stressed on the ASEAN-style 
political and economic regionalism as an important factor to maintain regional 
harmony on the policy actions.31 
 
 Regarding the ASEANTOM, Wan deemed it “the most significant form of 
regional nuclear cooperation within Southeast Asia since the Bangkok Treaty (1967 
– author)” given its different characteristic from other ASEAN regional platforms 
by determining a clear specific action plan with more than twenty activities. Wan 
realized great potentials for institutional development of the ASEANTOM due to 
ASEAN’s regional focus on security and economic development as well as its 
ASEAN Way of dealing with external and internal stakeholders. The process of 
ASEAN Community-building offered a conducive environment for ASEAN 
countries to move forward.32 
 
 This research acknowledges a significant contribution of Wan’s book to the 
study of international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear 3s by 
exploring the phenomenon at the regional level. However, the author has two points. 
First of all, ASEAN-style political and economic regionalism displays correlations 
31 Wan, “Regional Pathways,” 78-89. 
32 Wan, “Regional Pathways,” 91-92. 
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rather than associations to the development of regional nuclear order. Wan is correct 
to address the role of regional platforms such as ARF, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting (ADMM) with realization of challenges they are facing. However, these 
platforms do not automatically contribute to the development of regional nuclear 
order. This research suggests a consideration on the political process led to the 
determination of any institution. It also shed light on the contribution of different 
sources as independent variables shaping the regional governance on nuclear energy 
in ASEAN.  
 
 Secondly, ASEAN is an inter-governmental organization as clearly notified 
in the Article 3 of the ASEAN Charter.33 Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter also 
underlines that any decisions that bind all countries will be proceeded by the 
principle of consultation and consensus. It means that there will be no regional 
progress without the willingness of member states. If a member state disagrees, the 
whole process will be prolonged until it reaches the agreement. In addition, this 
principle has been seriously applicable to the international relations among ASEAN 
countries as well. Thus, the member states’ stances or preferences toward a single 
issue is relevant to the analysis determining region as a variable or a unit of analysis. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3-1. Research questions 
 
 Building on the aforementioned critique on Wan’s analysis, the author 
develops his research questions from the existing literature international cooperation 
on nuclear issues. The author’s main questions are why and how did ASEAN 
countries create the ASEANTOM? To explain the political process of constructing 
the ASEANTOM in details, the author borrows four specific questions from 
33 “Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 8. 
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Knopf.34 First of all, who were the initiators or leaders to propose the idea of 
cooperation and why? Second, how had the activities become a function of the 




 This study takes on exploratory case studies as its main method due to three 
reasons. First, the study of the nuclear issues in ASEAN needs more exploration.35 
Second, there is lack of research.36 Lastly, this exploratory study enhances “new 
insights” on the topic.37 Hymans called for theoretical building and testing by “using 
systematic process-tracing” that explores through the “detailed case studies.”38 On 
methodology, Yin underlines five essential components for case studies comprising 
research questions, unit of analysis, propositions the logical linkage between 
propositions and data, and the interpretation of findings. The following sections 
elaborate on how this work follows Yin’s approach. 
 
 This research, therefore, explores the formulation of regional governance on 
nuclear energy in ASEAN, particularly the ASEANTOM. To do so, it analyzes the 
34 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “International Cooperation on Nonproliferation: The Growth and 
Diversity of Cooperative Efforts,” in International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation 
ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2016), 12. 
35 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, Twelfth Edition, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Thomson Learning, 2010), 92; Russell K. Schutt, Investigating the social world: The 
process and practice of research, Fifth Edition, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
2006), 78. 
36 Ibid; Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Fourth Edition, 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 37; Schutt, “Investigating the social world,” 
288. 
37 Babbie, “The Practice of Social Research,” 93; Robert K. Yin, Qualitative Research from 
Start to Finish, (New York: Guildford Publications, 2011), 104; Schutt, “Investigating the 
social world,” 76. 
38 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “The Study of Nuclear Proliferation and Non-proliferation: 
Toward a New Consensus?,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: 




                                                          
international environment and national concerns of all ten ASEAN member 
countries consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam via their 
policies, plans, leader’s speeches. This work, however, does not aim to compare each 
country’s stance toward the global regimes and initiatives. The author realizes 
unequal proportionality of data as not all ASEAN countries are the parties of all 
existing regimes. Also, only some countries had played leading role to support the 
creation of regional governance on nuclear energy in ASEAN. 
 
 Main sources of this research are from academic articles, ASEAN 
documents, website on the international organizations related to nuclear 3s, and 
online news. This work will also employ the interviews with the policymakers who 
are relevant to the political processes led to the establishment of the ASEANTOM 
in order to gain “depth and roundedness of understanding” rather than the knowledge 
at the surface.39 The author also uses his experiences when he was the project 
assistant for a project to create a regional energy market from 2013-2014 as a 
reference to depict an image of energy politics in the region. As a result, this research 
aims to generate inductive richness of data to complement the existing explanations. 
 
3-3. Analytical framework 
 
 To reply the questions, the author formulates his own analytical framework 
from the variables used in the previous scholarship. This framework consists of three 
key components to explain the creation of the ASEANTOM. The first component is 
leadership. It focuses on the role of leading countries who actively engage in the 
formation of an international institution by proposing the ideas, providing platforms, 
managing the conflicts and cooperation at the initial stage of the cooperation. 
39 Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching, Second Edition, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2002), 65. 
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 The previous scholarship touched upon this factor but in different ways. 
Knopf proposed leadership as a factor to analyze stages of cooperation by 
underlining the role of the U.S. as a hegemonic power in the world system.40 Acharya 
and Johnston also called for the reflection of the most powerful state’s interests via 
the institutional design. They called it “systemic and sub-systemic power 
distributions.”41 Referring to these perspectives, leadership is a relevant factor to 
analyze the creation of a regional institution. However, it is not always the case that 
the most powerful state is the one who proposed the idea to the region. 
 
 The second component refers to the role of ideas and norms discussed at the 
existing international and regional institutions. These institutions facilitate the flow 
of ideas and learning process. In this case, the existing institutions mean the global 
regimes on nuclear non-proliferation and 3s such as IAEA as well as the regional 
institutions such as the EAS, ARF, ASEAN Summit, AMEM, informal meetings, 
and transnational networks. These institutions are essential to embrace new thought 
and set the agenda that might influence the interests or preferences of member states. 
 
 Several works emphasize the importance of ideational factors. For example, 
Knopf underlined norms and identity “potentially relevant” factor for international 
cooperation on nuclear issues.42 He made an assumption that the role of ideas and 
norms through social learning and transnational networks might influence the 
international cooperation on nuclear issues. 43 Acharya and Johnston reviewed 
loopholes in the previous literature by pointing out the underrepresentation of non-
40 Knopf, “International Cooperation on Nonproliferation,” 13. 
41 Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Comparing regional institutions: an 
introduction,” in Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative 
Perspective eds. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 19. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Knopf, “International Cooperation on Nonproliferation,” 14. 
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Western countries in the study of regionalism. The previous literature overlooked 
non-material components such as norms and ideas in contributing to the institutional 
design.44 They also concerned shared norms, values, beliefs, and cognitive models 
as factor.45 Similarly, Wan deemed these ideational factors positively contributed to 
the formation of regional nuclear order. Wan employed shared understanding of 
nuclear threat, beliefs, shared values and interests as a basis for his comparative 
analysis. He also considered the presence of security and economic institutions at the 
regional level as well.46  
 
 The final component is member states’ a priori preferences. For capabilities, 
the author refers to the capabilities ASEAN countries possessed or planned to 
acquire in order to enhance their energy security and nuclear safety before 
participating in the ASEANTOM. This research investigates capacity to produce 
nuclear power, balance between sources for energy supplies and electricity demand, 
and existing nuclear regulatory bodies at that time.47 The examination of these items 
also help understand the disproportionate role of each country in the regional 
governance on nuclear energy. 
 
 Capabilities are one among seven factors Knopf created to explain the 
international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. According to Knopf, 
capabilities are feasible determining factor for the state to cooperate or not cooperate 
in any regimes on nuclear non-proliferation. The state might have in mind their plans 
to acquire technology or technical support from joining the club.48 As a result, this 
research considers these capabilities as sources of the creation of the ASEANTOM. 
 
44 Acharya and Johnston, “Comparing regional institutions,” 11, 13. 
45 Acharya and Johnston, “Comparing regional institutions,” 16-18. 
46 Wan, “Regional Pathways,” 39. 
47 The author gains some insights from Pasit Somboonpakron, “Nuclear Energy in Southeast 
Asia: Pull Rods or Scram,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, USA, 2009). 
48 Knopf, “International Cooperation on Nonproliferation,” 15. 
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 Table 1. displays the analytical framework of this study. The author sets the 
creation of the ASEANTOM as a dependent variable. As aforementioned, this study 
explores three independent variables, including the leader who proposed the ideas to 
the region, the ideas and norms disseminated at regional platforms, and nuclear 
capabilities of ASEAN countries. In addition, the author adds an intervening variable 
that marks the policy shift of ASEAN countries to delay the plans to build their 
nuclear power plants, which is the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in March 2011.49 
 
Table 1. Analytical framework 
 
Independent variables Intervening variable Dependent variable 
Leadership Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident 
The creation of the 
ASEANTOM Global and regional 
norms 






1. Institutional Development of Regional Nuclear Governance 
in ASEAN 
 
1-1. The establishment of the SEANWFZ (1995) 
 
 ASEAN has a history of nuclear development since 1960s. According to 




                                                          
the TRR-1 in 1962. Viet Nam ranked the second country in ASEAN to start a 
research reactor under the provision of the Da Lat Nuclear Research Reactor 
(DNRR) in March 1963. This reactor was improved its capability from 250 kW to 
500 kW by 1982. The Philippines followed this trend by operating a nuclear research 
reactor so-called PRR-1 in August 1963. This reactor was later upgraded to technical 
and training purposes. The fourth country was Indonesia. It generated the first 
research reactor, TRIGA Mark III with small capacity and expanded in 1979. The 
fifth was Malaysia. Its research reactor was first operated in 1982. While there was 
no record of nuclear development in the rest of ASEAN.50 
 
 At the same period, there appeared a global effort to reinforce the norm of 
nuclear non-proliferation via the NPT. This treaty was signed in March 1970. A key 
aftermath, according to Singh, was a global division of a “nuclear bipolarity” 
between the “nuclear haves” and the “nuclear have-nots.” Although there was a 
negative view of the have-nots seeing this treaty as “an incomplete and unequal 
treaty document,” the cooperation has been maintained in several ways, including 
safeguards and inspections activities, the control of nuclear export, the adoption of 
agreements and pledges at both regional and national level.51 Fortunately, the world 
had a chance to witness the concurrence on the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America. 
This occurrence positively contributed to the NPT regime. It was the first time seeing 
NWFZ as a complementary approach to the system. 
 
 However, there were four criticisms on the aspect of the NPT regime related 
to the situation in the Third World countries at that time. First of all, the non-
proliferation was mutually exclusive from the alliance system in the world politics. 
Second issue was about the “discriminatory” practice in its structure and application. 
Third, the NPT did not address the problem of vertical proliferation52 sufficiently. 
50 Putra, “The dynamics of nuclear energy,” 585-589. 
51 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 1. 
52 This concept refers to the efforts by nation-states to accelerate their nuclear capabilities 
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Finally, the NPT itself did not treat Non-NWS to acquire civilian benefits as literally 
stated.53 Adding to that, the non-aligned countries called for the elimination of 
nuclear testing by NWS. There were also the problems with cases of Iraq and North 
Korea displaying the violation while being members of the treaty. Discrimination 
was a big debate at that time.54 
 
 In the ASEAN region, there was a regional effort to set up the SEANWFZ 
following several successful cases around the world such as the issuance of the 
Declaration on the De-nuclearization of Africa at Lusaka Meeting in 1964, the 29th 
UNGA resolutions on NWFZs in the Middle East and South Asia. As already 
mentioned in the section on literature review, SEANWFZ was also acknowledged 
after the success in concluding the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and the Treaty of 
Rarotonga in 1985.55 To accomplish the conclusion of SEANWFZ, ASEAN should 
work to clarify some aspects consisting of the persuasion to the Philippines to 
withdraw U.S. military bases, the invitation of Malaysia to ensure its nuclear 
relations with the UK, the inducement to Australia to relinquish its nuclear strategy 
in the Indian Ocean which might conflict to the U.S. policy, the enforcement of 
Indonesia to disavow its nuclear option, and the warrant of New Zealand’s 
continuing path toward non-proliferation.56 
 
 There were two ASEAN countries who were very active in pushing the 
agenda of SEANWFZ at the ASEAN Summits: Indonesia and Malaysia. President 
Suharto delivered his speech to proceed with the idea of NWFZ in the region, 
although ASEAN could not solve the existing Cambodian Conflict. According to 
Singh, this effort was a part of Indonesia’s faithfulness to be an independent and 
domestically. While the concept of horizontal proliferation denotes the efforts by nation-
states or non-state actors that do not currently possess, to acquire nuclear capabilities.  
53 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 7-8. 
54 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 9. 
55 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 24. 
56 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 26. 
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active actor in the international arena.57 While Malaysia needed to link the concept 
of NWFZ to ZOPFAN, also known as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971.58 
However, it was not easy to reach the consensus on the adoption of ZOPFAN due to 
two reasons. First issue relates to the signing of NWS. Some thought that the treaty 
was meaningless without their signatures. Second, it was difficult to deal with the 
geographical limitations” given the situation at that time. The membership of 
ASEAN was not reached ten. Some expressed their concern over regional 
domination by a specific country.59 There was a distress that this NWFZ would 
benefit the Soviet Union due to its military presence in its alliance’s territories. This 
circumstance would inevitably bring the U.S. to balance the Soviet Union. Then, 
ASEAN could not totally avoid the great power politics.60 
 
 After a decade, the ASEAN member states finally signed the Treaty at the 
fifth ASEAN Summit in December 1995. The signing itself reflected three key 
characteristics of changing geopolitical landscape: (1) the end of the Cold War (2) 
the expansion of ASEAN membership to ten and (3) the peaceful solution of all 
regional conflicts at that time, particularly the Cambodian Conflict. The document 
comprises 13 pages and 22 articles. The Treaty entered into force in 1997 after the 
seventh signatory, Viet Nam, ratified and acceded. Singh indicated several 
advantages of the SEANWFZ Treaty as (1) the reinforcement of ASEAN countries’ 
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation (2) the formation of “a regional verification 
system to ensure compliance with SEANWFZ” (3) the prioritization of consultation 
in the dispute settlement and (4) a platform for further socialization cuing a positive 
sign to the neighboring areas.61 
57 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 32. 
58 In the declaration, the parties publicly stated their intent to keep South East Asia “[f]ree 
from any form or manner of interference by outside powers” and “broaden the areas of 
cooperation.” 
59 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 33. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 37. 
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 Although the SEANWFZ Treaty was signed by all ASEAN countries, a 
more-than-decade disagreement between ASEAN countries and NWS did exist. The 
U.S. objected to sign this Treaty due to its dissatisfaction over the coverage of 
sensitive areas, including continental shelves and EEZs. It found the provision “too 
restrictive” for the rights of passage and “too sweeping and unprecedented” for 
nuclear restraints. Territorial issue was also problematic for China. It expressed 
support for general idea of the Treaty, except the application to the disputed areas of 
the Spratlys. For France, President Chirac pointed out that the country might rethink 
some details. While Russia required some “clarification on how the [T]reaty will be 
implemented,” particularly the passage of the ships.62 
 
1-2. Regional path toward nuclear governance in ASEAN and the 
formation of NEC-SSN (2008) 
 
 After the SEANWFZ Treaty entered into force in 1997, there were four 
critical developments for the establishment of regional institutions on nuclear 
security in ASEAN. First of all, the misunderstandings between NWS and ASEAN 
countries due to ASEAN efforts to compromise between their interests and NWS’ 
concerns. Second, ASEAN countries could find a way to deal with U.S. worry over 
NSAs by citing the evolving international view on the necessity of “an interim 
regime” while moving toward the full implementation of the treaty. Third, China 
was the first country to express its intention to accede to the SEANWFZ Treaty due 
to ASEAN’s ability to accommodate the fear of China over the disputed territory. 
This is a breakthrough for a foggy atmosphere at that time. Finally, the Foreign 
Ministers concurred on the establishment of the SEANWFZ Commission to 
62 Acharya and Boutin, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,” 225, 227; 
Muthiah Alagappa, “A nuclear-weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia: Problems and 
prospects,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 41, no. 3 (1987): 178-179. 
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represent ASEAN in contacting the officials from NWS. This Commission set up the 
Executive Committee to prepare necessary documents, monitor the compliance, and 
interact with IAEA.63 
 
 Moreover, ASEAN was trying to push its treaty to be recognized by the 
international community. There were three legal and technical issues: its accordance 
with the NPT, the status of consultations with NWS, and the drafting of the rules of 
procedures. ASEAN countries had to discuss on the decision-making under the 
Treaty, whether it should be majority or consensus. Another question was on the 
participation, who could be in the Executive Committee.64 Opening the space for 
NWS’ signature, ASEAN has proceeded the SEANWFZ Treaty with the similar 
status as when it was enforced in 1997. After the signing of the SEANWFZ Treaty 
in 1995, there are three regional statements that are relevant to the institutional 
development of nuclear issues in ASEAN. These statements comprise the ARF 
Statement on Non-Proliferation (2004) and ARF Statement Supporting the 
Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2007), ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism (2007), and Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, 
and Environment (2007). 
 
 The first two documents were issued following to the global regimes on 
nuclear non-proliferation at that time. There were several global initiatives to 
promote nuclear non-proliferation at that time, including the NPT Review 
Conferences and the CTBT. The NPT marked the global efforts to promote 
international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear 
technology. It also aims to move forward the global disarmament. The NPT is the 
only one international treaty that legally binds the NWS.65 In addition to the treaty, 
63 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 51-52. 
64 Singh, “ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” 52-53. 
65 “Review Conference of the Parties of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” United Nations, accessed May 26, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/. 
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the parties agreed to arrange the reviewing conferences every five years. The main 
objective of these conferences is to evaluate the implementation of its provisions and 
disseminate further measures or recommendations. 
 
 At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties reached the agreement on 
adopting the final document, evaluating the past performances and the key issues 
related to the three core principles of NPT, non-proliferation, disarmament, and 
peaceful use of nuclear. Moreover, there were issues on the legal status of past 
agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Apart from the two NPT 
Review Conferences, there was an additional global effort on nuclear non-
proliferation. In 1996, the UNGA adopted the CTBT. The main objective of this 
treaty is to fully prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosions in both military and 
civilian ways. It also emphasizes the commitment of the parties to proceed with any 
actions that would cause, encourage, and participate in nuclear weapon explosion. 
This treaty sets up the mechanisms to monitor nuclear-related activities and 
provisions of punishment in case of any violations.66 
 
 The UNSC unanimously adopted the Resolution 1540 in April 2004. This 
resolution reaffirms the principle of nuclear non-proliferation by considering any 
state’s effort to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapon and any modalities 
of delivery “a threat to international peace and security.”67 It also prohibits the state 
to receive any support from non-state actors to strengthen the abovementioned 
activities. Principally, this resolution insists on its binding obligations. All states 
have to implement national legislations to foster the nuclear non-proliferation 
activities. It also requires the states to prevent the illicit trafficking by enforcing 
appropriate measures to control related materials domestically. Besides, this 
66 “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): History of the Treaty,” United 
N a t i o n s  O f f i c e  o f  D i s a r m a m e n t  A f f a i r s ,  a c c e s s e d  M a y  2 6 ,  2 0 1 9 , 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/ctbt/. 




                                                          
resolution promotes international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and full 
implementation of the states.68 
 
 The regional efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation was acknowledged 
by the ARF Statement on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in 2004. It was the first time 
ASEAN and other main players, particularly the NWS, declared their stances toward 
the issue. The participants would take necessary measures to implement the existing 
agreements on nuclear non-proliferation comprising effective export controls, 
review their abilities to radioactive sources and political commitment to follow the 
guidance. It is also referred in the statement that the members strongly supported the 
UNSC Resolution 1540. The ARF participants expressed their commitment to a 
successful 2005 NPT Review Conference as well. 
 
 On the origins of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, ASEAN 
leaders expressed their intention on anti-terrorism since 1997. They adopted the 
Declaration on Transnational Crime in 1997 followed by the Action Plan in 1999. 
Following to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ASEAN adopted the 2001 ASEAN 
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001 in order to join 
hand with the global efforts to prevent terrorism by improving collaborations at all 
levels.69 Apart from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there were two events directly related 
to nuclear security and terrorism: Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan Network and North 
Korea issue. A. Q. Khan is a Pakistani scientist, who played an essential role in 
establishing a network running commercial exchange of nuclear technology and 
equipment in the black market such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, and so on. This 
network was very strong given its strong connections with businessmen in over 20 
countries. It gained a lot of money by offering a wide range of products and prices.70 
68 Ibid. 
69 S. Pushpanathan, “ASEAN Efforts to Combat Terrorism,” published August 20, 2003, 
https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-efforts-to-combat-terrorism-by-spushpanathan. 
70 Molly MacCalman, “A. Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 9, No. 1 (2016): 104. 
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The importance of this issue revealed that the non-state actors could be an actor in 
selling illicit products and conducting illegal activities related to nuclear weapons. 
 
 ASEAN also addressed and expressed its concern over regional nuclear 
threats such as the case of North Korea. At the ARF meetings, ASEAN reiterated its 
support to peaceful process on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea withdrew from 
NPT in 2003 responding to President George W. Bush’s address criticizing North 
Korea as an “Axis of Evil” as well as the revelation on North Korea’s secret activities 
that could violate the 1994 agreement. In the same year, the Six-Party Talks which 
are the multilateral effort to solve the nuclear issue took place. There had been six 
principal rounds with several phases of talks among five countries (China, Japan, 
North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States). During the negotiation 
process, there were many forms of interaction between North Korea and other 
parties. For example, North Korea pledged to “freeze” its program if the other parties 
promised to provide economic assistance.71 
 
 The ASEAN Leaders viewed terrorism as a profound threat to international 
peace and security and “a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and 
prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020.” They expressed 
commitment to combat terrorism in accordance with the UN Charter, international 
laws and relevant UN resolutions. They also stated that “cooperative efforts in this 
regard should consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with 
specific circumstances in the region and in each member country.”72 However, the 
2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism does not mention 
any measures to prevent nuclear terrorism or any illicit activities prohibited by global 
71 Pádraig Collins, “War games: a timeline of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development,” 
The Guardian, March 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/north-
korea-nuclear-weapons-development-timeline; Kelsey, Davenport, “The Six-Party Talks at 





                                                          
 regimes and mechanisms on nuclear non-proliferation. The 2007 ASEAN 
Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) is the first and only one ASEAN 
convention to prevent nuclear terrorism in ASEAN. Referring to the International 
Convention for the Suppression Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), this 
convention acceded to these global regimes by defining the legal term of “offences” 
following to them.73 
 
 The final regional statement related to nuclear issues examined in this 
section is the ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability. The issue of 
sustainability had in place been a key global aspiration the UN members intended to 
attain since the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992 and the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, which set the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The global effort to promote sustainable development 
continued on the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). The key 
outcome of the WSSD was the confirmation of the concept of sustainable 
development, connecting poverty, environment, and management of natural 
resources. The meeting also stressed on the strategic role of partnerships in the 
development process.74 In addition to these global platforms, ASEAN expressed its 
commitment is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
order to fight against the climate change. 
 
 ASEAN issued its ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability in 
order to reiterate its strong support to sustainable development in the region. One 
73 “ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism,” ASEAN Secretariat, accessed May 26, 
2019, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ACCT.pdf. 
74 Susan R. Fletcher, World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD): Background and 






                                                          
key point of the declaration related to nuclear issues is ASEAN leaders were obliged 
to “forge ASEAN-wide cooperation to establish a regional nuclear safety regime.”75 
At the 25th AMEM Meeting, the Ministers noted the efforts to create a regional 
institution on nuclear energy and called for report of the progress in the following 
AMEM in 2008. With the recognition of increasing oil prices, the ministers stated 
an urgent need to take actions. One of their solutions was “civilian nuclear energy.” 
While emphasizing a possibility for nuclear energy, the ministers addressed their 
recognition with the principle of nuclear non-proliferation, safety, and security. They 
recommended the advancement of regional cooperation to promote clean energy and 
effective measures for carbon reduction as well.76 
 
 Singapore and Malaysia played a key role in developing a regional 
institution on nuclear energy. Singapore arranged three special meetings in January, 
May, and October 2008. While Malaysia proposed a revised draft of Term of 
References (ToR) of this regional institution. At first, the institution was named the 
Nuclear Energy Safety Sub-Sector Network (NES-SSN). Its main objective was to 
explore a regional cooperation on nuclear energy mainly for electricity. However, 
this scope was widened to public education, capacity building, and information 
sharing by the 26th AMEM Meeting.77 The name NES-SSN was changed to the 
NEC-SSN after a number of discussions. This name was formally acknowledged at 
the AMEM 27th AMEM Meeting in Mandalay.78 This sub-sector network operated 
75 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability,”. 
76 ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy 
(AMEM) Meeting “Energising ASEAN Power to Dynamic Asia” Singapore, 23 August 
2007,”. 
77 “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 26th ASEAN Ministers on Energy (AMEM) Meeting 
“ASEAN Cooperation to Strengthen Energy Security” Bangkok, 7 August 2008,” ASEAN 
Secretariat, accessed May 26, 2019, https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-ministerial-
statement-of-the-26th-asean-ministers-on-energy-meeting-amem-asean-cooperation-to-
strengthen-energy-security-bangkok-7-august-2008. 
78 “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 27th ASEAN Ministers on Energy (AMEM) Meeting 
“Securing ASEAN’s Energy Future Towards Prosperity and Sustainability” Mandalay, 
M ya n ma r,  2 9  J u l y  2 0 0 9 , ”  AS E AN  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  a c c e s s e d  M a y 2 6 ,  2 0 1 9 , 
h t t p s : / / w w w . a s e a n . o r g / w p -
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under the purview of the ACE and the energy ministries of the ASEAN member 
states. At the time of writing this thesis, the NEC-SSN is still operating. 
 
1-3. ASEAN and its participation in other regional mechanisms on 
nuclear issues 
 
 In addition to the agenda-setting at both global and regional level, ASEAN 
countries have been active participants to the transnational networks on nuclear non-
proliferation, safety, and security such as ASTOP, Asian Network for Education in 
Nuclear Technology (ANENT), Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN), and so on. 
The first three are regional platforms for regional senior-officials to disseminate the 
situation and exchange their views on global nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament. From the author’s personal observation after reading through the key 
discussions at ASTOP Meetings, it is likely that this ASTOP has been playing an 
essential role as a platform for policymakers to share their concerns and set the 
agendas. The participants of ASTOP are from all ASEAN countries, plus some 
countries from the Asia-Pacific. 
 
 According to Table 2., one topic that had been stressed out most was the 
assessment of the regional nuclear threats, particularly North Korea’s and Iran’s. 
Apart from this, there had been an exchange of idea on how IAEA and its additional 
protocol is important as well as technical issues on the implementation of the existing 








                                                          
Table 2. Key discussions at the ASTOP Meetings 2003-200879  
 
Year Key discussions 
1st ASTOP 
(November 2003) 
- The ongoing efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and 
WMD 
- The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
- The need to further develop national institutions 
- The need to foster the cooperation on export control 
following the 1st Asian Export Control Policy Dialogue 
and the 11th Asian Export Control Seminar 




- The review of the trends on illegal nuclear activities, 
including North Korea’s nuclear threats and the illicit 
activities of A.Q. Khan Network 
- The measures to raise awareness on non-proliferation 
to reinforce the existing regimes such as IAEA 
- The need to enhance understanding to the adoption of 
treaties and norms that member states might encounter 
3rd ASTOP 
(February 2006) 
- The review of the trends on illegal nuclear activities, 
including North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear development 
- The measures to raise awareness on non-proliferation 
to reinforce the existing regimes such as IAEA and PSI 
- The acceleration of member states’ awareness on the 
implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 
- The need to enhance understanding to the adoption of 
treaties and norms that member states might encounter 
79 Compiled by the author from “Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP),” 




                                                          
4th ASTOP 
(February 2007) 
- The recognition of IAEA Additional Protocol as the 
most realistic and effective measure to nuclear non-
proliferation 
- The emphasis on North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear 
threats 
- The mutual understanding on Assurance of Nuclear 
Fuel Supply 
- The emphasis on nuclear security as a counter-measure 
to nuclear terrorism 
- The difficulties in implementing the export control 
measures 
- The vitality of PSI 
5th ASTOP 
(May 2008) 
- The emphasis on North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear 
threats 
- The sharing of the opinions on the implementation of 
UNSC Resolutions, export control system, and IAEA 
additional protocol 
- The outcomes of Japan’s PSI Maritime Interdiction 
Exercise “Pacific Shield 07”  
6th ASTOP 
(December 2009) 
- North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear threats and the 
implementation of UNSC Resolutions 
- Peaceful uses of nuclear technology, including IAEA 
additional protocol 
- Nuclear security and PSI 
 
 While ANENT plays an important role as a direct platform for IAEA. It 
complements the existing programs by focusing on capacity building based on 
thematic issues.80 The membership of ANENT has increased over time. Most of 
80 “History,” ANENT, accessed May 26, 2019, https://www.anentweb.org/sub0106. 
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them are from the Asia-Pacific. There are five ASEAN countries joining the club 
since 2004: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Malaysia, 
Viet Nam, and Indonesia were once the host of the committee meetings.81 This 
function is similar to ANSN. ANSN is a platform facilitates regional collaboration 
and national capacity building. All ASEAN members are members of this network. 
Its characteristics aligned with the ASEAN style of regional governance. This 
platform also formed “topical groups” to share information and experiences, mainly 
on nuclear safety issues such as regulatory infrastructure, emergency preparedness, 
radioactive waste management, and so on.82 
 
 To commit itself to the global nuclear non-proliferation in 1990s, it has an 
impressive institutional development at the regional level as witnessed in the three 
documents regarding nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and nuclear 
energy cooperation. ASEAN was also active participant in several regional stages 
such as the ASTOP, ANENT, and ANSN. The presence of ASEAN countries in 
these platforms displayed its continuous commitment of ASEAN in promoting the 
principle of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technology. 
In addition to the SEANWFZ, ASEAN leaders concluded on the establishment of a 
sub-regional network to promote regional cooperation on nuclear energy under the 
supervision of the AMEM with main focus on exchange and training. These regional 
frameworks and institutions had maintained the momentum of nuclear energy 










                                                          
2. Creating Regional Institution on Nuclear Energy 
Governance: The Case of ASEANTOM 
 
2-1. Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011 
 
 The Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011 is the third nuclear accident after 
the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident in 1979 and the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident 
in 1986. According to the report on the facts of the incident by the IAEA, the first 
step of this accident derived from the earthquake in the East of Japan, around the 
Pacific Coast. The earthquake caused the tsunami, which destroyed the power 
systems, apparatus, and heat sink systems of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant. Then, the power plant lost its ability to produce electricity because its main 
mechanisms were not in workable condition. There were several blackout events in 
the area after the flooding. The blackout shattered the plant heat system, resulting in 
the overheating and melting of the nuclear units. The melting of the nuclear units 
wrecked the reactor cores, which comprised radioactive material. Figure 1. outlines 
the core sequence of the accident.83 
 
Figure 1. Core sequence of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 201184 
83 IAEA, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Technical Volume 1 Description and Context of 
the Accident, (Vienna: IAEA, 2015), 2.  
84 Compiled by the author from IAEA, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, 2. 
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 This circumstance was the most undesirable because radiation would be 
uncovered. It could bring about socio-economic impacts to the public. First of all, 
the surrounding areas had to be evacuated. Second, consuming food and drinking 
water from the area was prohibited due to a concern over the radiological 
contamination. Third, there was an announcement of emergency in order to stabilize 
the conditions, a large number of people could not survive normally. 85  The 
international community responded to this incident at many stages. For example, the 
Fifth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety, one month right after the incident, concurred on the arrangement of the 
meeting to review and disseminate the aftermath of the incident and the potency of 
the Convention. The Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety scrutinized the international context and national 
conditions on-site and off-site. It also reviewed some concrete actions to advance 
transparency and effectiveness by launching a working group to reinforce further 
85 Ibid. 
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actions and proposals concerning nuclear safety under the Convention. Some of 
these ideas were to improve boldness in reviewing process as well as to generate 
national reports and periodic evaluations with reference to the IAEA safety 
standards.86 
 
 There were additional two meetings to follow-up the critical assessment of 
the Convention and the accident. One was the Sixth Review Meeting in April 2014. 
A main topic of the meeting was to hear the progress on the implementation of 
nuclear safety measures discussed in the Fifth Meeting. There were a number of 
improvements on emergency preparedness and nuclear safety arrangements. 
Besides, there were ongoing progress such as the creation of national safety 
frameworks, the attempts to initiate regulatory bodies, the expansion of international 
cooperation, and so on. After the Sixth Review Meeting, the IAEA convened the 
Diplomatic Conference and the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in February 
2015. The contracting parties of the IAEA accorded on the three principles on the 
prevention of accidents with radiological results. First of all, they determined more 
restricted allowance of new nuclear power plants by emphasizing the need to 
converge with the prevention measures. Second, they required regular and periodical 
evaluations on nuclear safety of the existing mechanisms. Third, they encouraged 
the adaptation of national requirements and regulations to the IAEA standards and 
good practices.87  
 
 At the regional level, ASEAN expressed “sympathy and solidarity with 
Japan over the incident” in the ASEAN Leaders’ Statement at the 18th ASEAN 
Summit in Indonesia. In the section on regional cooperation on nuclear safety, 
ASEAN expressed its full support to accede to the IAEA standards of nuclear safety 
and security. Moreover, the leaders acknowledged the need to advance “a 
86 IAEA, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, 195-196. 
87 IAEA, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, 196-197. 
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coordinated ASEAN approach” by working together with the IAEA and other 
partners.88  The AMEM’s Statement followed the ideas referred to in the Chair’s 
Statement. It also noted some required actions such as information sharing, the 
formation of “a coordinated approach,” regional nuclear emergency preparedness, 
and the reinforcement of the IAEA standards. They assigned the senior officials to 
initiate a relevant program collaborating with the IAEA to uphold the principle of 
nuclear safety and security in the region.89 
 
 At the national level, the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Accident influenced the 
postponement of the building of nuclear power plants in many countries. Three 
countries, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand had to delay the plan immediately. 
Malaysia announced its plan to build two nuclear power plants in 1990. After the 
incident, the government suspended the plan but still had an attempt by conducting 
a feasibility studies with reports. 90  For the Philippines, they had had a long 
aspiaration to build a nuclear power plant since 1976. However, the nuclear accidents 
of Three Mile Islands and Chernobyl influenced the decision. This trend was similar 
in case of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. In case of Thailand, the government 
halted the plan and extended the possible year to build a nuclear power plant to 2023. 
The Ministry of Energy attempted to resume the plan in 2012, however, it 
encountered a sharp criticism from the public.91 
 
88 “Chair’s Statement of the 18th ASEAN Summit Jakarta 7-8 May 2011 “ASEAN 
Community in a Global Community of Nations”,” ASEAN Secretariat, accessed May 26, 
2019, https://www.asean.org/storage/archive/Statement_18th_ASEAN_Summit.pdf. 
89 “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 29th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) 
Jerudong, Brunei Darussalam, 20 September 2011,” ASEAN Secretariat, accessed May 26, 




90 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 129-130. 
91 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 131. 
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 In case of Indonesia, the incident did not affect the government’s decision 
as much as the aforementioned countries because its elites favored to pursue nuclear 
energy. However, the government was not successful as they faced strong resistance 
from civil society organizations. Their key argument was that Indonesia would not 
be capable of coping with the problems of nuclear safety. They mentioned several 
disasters such as the tsunami in Sumatra in 2004, a mud-volcano eruption in East 
Java in 2006, and an earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006.92 The elites of Myanmar 
also followed the equivalent ideas as Indonesian one. According to the former 
minister of science and technology, having nuclear research was a sign of “a modern 
nation.” However, there appeared no nuclear activities and no statements linked to 
the incident. In Viet Nam, nuclear safety was one of the key issues for its nuclear 
power plant as well.93 While Singapore once emphasized the importance of nuclear 
for its survival, it changed the plan after considering a report saying that this idea did 
not match with the size of the country.94 
 
 While the rest of ASEAN countries, including Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, and Lao PDR, did not have any motivations to acquire for nuclear 
weapons whether there was the Fukushima Nuclear Accident or not. These countries 
only had some activities related to nuclear issues. For example, Laos defended the 
superiority of national sovereignty over the decision to pursue nuclear energy, 
although it did not aim to acquire one. For Cambodia, the country realized the 
importance of nuclear energy but it required more time to study the possibility and 
impacts. In case of Brunei, it had general exchanges with the IAEA but the scope of 
discussion was mainly health and agriculture.95 As a result, the Fukushima Nuclear 
92 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 136. 
93 Linda J. Yarr and Nguyễn Thị Thanh Thủy, “Vietnam: Nuclear Ambitions and Domestic 
Dynamics,” in Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes 
eds. Mike M. Mochizuki and Deepa M. Ollapally (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2016), 166. 
94 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 132-133. 
95 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 128-129. 
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Accident in 2011 affected the governments’ decisions on nuclear energy in different 
ways. One impact of the incident toward the institutional development of nuclear 
energy governance in ASEAN was awareness of the member states on nuclear safety 
and security. Nonetheless, the Fukushima Accident plays a role as an intervening 
factor as it cannot explain the whole process led to the creation of the ASEANTOM. 
There should be more relevant components pushing ASEAN to form a new regional 
institution.  
 
2-2. Identifying sources of institutional design 
 
 2-2-1. Leadership 
 
 This sub-section explains the role of leadership in facilitating the 
establishment of a regional institution on nuclear governance in ASEAN. The author 
found that Thailand was the initiator of this project. The author analyzes Thailand’s 
aspirations and actions toward the formation of this network. Thailand has played a 
constructive role in the process of ASEAN Community-building since its inception 
in 1967. Col. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, invited the 
other four founding fathers to come to Thailand to disseminate the future of 
ASEAN. 96  Col. Thanat employed his diplomatic skills in convincing the four 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had different religious background. An informal 
discussion taken place with a very flexible atmosphere in Chon Buri, a very famous 
seaside town. Col. Thanat also invited them to play the golf before coming to 
Bangkok to sign the Bangkok Declaration, which is the establishing document of the 
ASEAN as a regional organization.97 
 
96 The other four founding fathers are Adam Malik from Indonesia, Abdul Razak Hussein 
from Malaysia, Narciso Ramos from the Philippines, and S. Rajaratnam from Singapore. 




                                                          
 In addition to the establishment, Thailand has played its constructive role in 
promoting the institutional development of the ASEAN Community in several 
chances. In 1995, Prime Minister Anand Panyarchun proposed the idea of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to the region. The key point of AFTA is to reduce 
tariff barriers to 0-5% within fifteen years. This initiative changed the regional 
dynamics from political to economic orientation. The ASEAN Charter, which is the 
constitution of all ASEAN members, entered into force in December 2008, the first 
three months of Thailand’s ASEAN Chairmanship at that time. During its 
chairmanship, ASEAN leaders endorsed the Cha Am-Hua Hin Declaration on the 
Roadmap for the ASEAN Community. 98  The ASEAN Community has been a 
national agenda of Thailand. The importance of ASEAN to Thailand concerns the 
characteristics of Thai diplomacy. As Surin Pitsuwan, Former ASEAN Secretary-
General, emphasized in his speech about the importance of ASEAN for Thailand, 
“ASEAN is our intellectual legacy. It will provide a ground for better 
competitiveness in the world.”99 
 
 Thailand was aware of the advent of the ASEAN Community in 2015. The 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which is the policy 
planning organization at the national level, released the Eleventh National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (2012-2016). This national plan stated the necessity 
for Thailand to engage ASEAN in several issues. First of all, Thailand realized the 
98 “Āsīan Kab Prathēt Thai [ASEAN and Thailand],” ASEAN-Thailand, accessed May 26, 





99 Surin Pitsuwan’s speech on the occasion of the opening of the ASEAN Studies Center, 
Chulalongkorn University 24 February 2012. See ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn 
University, “Chulalongkorn Mahawittayalai Kab Kan Trīam Khwām Phrǭm Sū Prachākhom 
Āsīan [Chulalongkorn University and the Preparation for the ASEAN Community],” in Dr. 




                                                          
economic importance of ASEAN as “a new economic center.” The plan encouraged 
related stakeholders to proceed the multilateral free trade agreements negotiations. 
Second, the plan called for “more proactive” role in the community-building process 
by complying “with its commitments under various cooperative frameworks.” 
Thirdly, the plan indicated some priorities that would work with such as international 
cultural cooperation, infrastructure, and food and energy security. More importantly, 
the plan emphasized the advancement of Thailand’s role in the international 
environmental frameworks and mechanisms.100    
 
 With a clear national direction related to the ASEAN Community, the 
executives of the OAP deemed this national direction as an opportunity to come up 
with an initiative.101 It played a leading role in developing a framework for all 
network of regulatory bodies on nuclear in ASEAN. In celebration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of its establishment, the executive officers decided to propose the 
concept of any form of a regional institution to enhance Thailand’s role in the 
ASEAN Community. On September 1-2, 2011, the OAP invited the representatives 
of each ASEAN member to meet at the “International Conference on Safety, Security 
and Safeguards in Nuclear Energy” in Bangkok, Thailand. The representative of 
Thailand proposed the idea at that meeting. The idea was positively welcomed by all 
national representatives. They agreed on the principle to establish “a network or an 
institution” to engage all regulatory bodies together under the framework of ASEAN. 
 
100 “Summary of the Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-
2016),” National Economic and Social Development Board, Thailand, accessed May 26, 
2019, https://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_w3c/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=4165. 
101 The author would like to express his appreciation to an executive at the OAP for sharing 
very useful information and guidance that provides a comprehensive view of the ideas and 
processes led to the formation of the network. The following paragraphs are re-written from 
OAP, “Kan Damnnœ̄nkan Čhadtang Khrư̄akhai Khwām Plodphai Thāng Niwkhlīa Læ 
Rangsī Nai Āsīan [The Establishment of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on 
Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM)],” [Unpublished Manuscript].  
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 To guarantee successful formation of this network, the OAP set up a working 
group with fourteen people from related government organizations, including 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (Department of International Organizations and 
Department of ASEAN Affairs), Ministry of Science and Technology (Office of 
International Cooperation), Ministry of Energy (Office of Nuclear Study and 
Cooperation), National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, and nine 
officers from the OAP. The group concurred on the coordination to push this agenda 
forward. Each representative agreed to promote this initiative at the related regional 
meetings. There had been six times of meetings since the formation of the working 
group in 2011. 
 
 The representative from the Ministry of Science and Technology introduced 
this idea to the 62nd ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (ASEAN-
COST) in November 2011. The representative from the MFA also proposed the 
concept paper to the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) in March 2012 and the 
ASEAN Summit in April the same year. At the meeting, the Prime Minister of 
Thailand expressed the idea to the Plenary Session. The consequence of this effort is 
acknowledged by the Chairman’s Statement. It stated that ASEAN leaders accept 
the idea to “develop a network” of “nuclear regulatory bodies” in the region. The 
statement also outlined three features of this network: (1) exchange information and 
experiences (2) promote cooperation (3) improve capabilities on nuclear 3s.102 
 
 With positive responses from the aforementioned regional meetings, the 
working group decided to push this initiative as an ASEAN sectoral body under the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). The OAP in collaboration with the 
MFA co-drafted the Term of Reference (ToR) of thins network. Then, they invited 
102 “Chairman’s Statement of the 20th ASEAN Summit,” ASEAN Secretariat, accessed May 





                                                          
twelve representatives from the nine ASEAN embassies to consider the draft of ToR 
at the Ad Hoc Meeting on the ASEANTOM in August 2012. After that, the OAP 
circulated this ToR to all regulatory bodies in ASEAN for approving the document 
for two times. There were two countries giving feedbacks to the working group, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. The working group finalized the preliminary draft of 
ToR. It required an assistance from the MFA to circulate the document to all member 
states for formal approval. 
 
 Apart from the process of asking for approval from the member countries in 
the region, Thailand called for international support from other institutions and 
actors outside the region. First of all, Thailand expressed its intention to reinforce 
the establishment of the ASEANTOM at the 55th General Conference of IAEA in 
September 2011. One year later, five ASEAN member countries, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam, supported the establishment of 
the ASEANTOM in their statements at the 56th General Conference in Vienna. 
Second, the Prime Minister of Thailand announced its desire to proceed the 
ASEANTOM at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on March 26-27, 2012. 
Lastly, Thai Minister of Science and Technology took similar action at the 
Fukushima Ministerial Conference in December 2012. 
 
 At the First Meeting of the ASEANTOM in September 2013, the 
representatives formally endorsed the ToR. There were several issues discussed at 
the meeting such as the Plan of Actions (PoA) of the network for the year 2014-
2016, the identification of common interests and best practices, and the capacity-
building of the member countries on 3S. The representatives concurred on the 
priorities of the network, including nuclear emergency preparedness, nuclear 
forensics, measures on anti-nuclear terrorism, and illicit export-import of nuclear 
materials. One week later, the SOM in Brunei Darussalam also formally endorsed 
the ToR. The Second Meeting of the ASEANTOM was held in Chiang Mai in 
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August 2014. This meeting also acknowledged technical meeting on environmental 
radiation monitoring in ASEAN in its agenda. 
 
 Two key agendas discussed at the Second Meeting consisted of the 
management of the ASEANTOM and the formation of a network on environmental 
issues under the ASEANTOM. The meeting recognized the status of the 
ASEANTOM as a sectoral body under the APSC. The Chair of the network will 
follow the rotation of ASEAN Chairmanship. For the year 2015, Malaysia accepted 
to take lead in convening the annual meeting. Following to this, the OAP in 
collaboration with the MFA informed the member countries as well as the ASEAN 
Secretariat on the decision of the Second Meeting of the ASEANTOM. On 
environmental issues, the meeting concluded to form a new network so-called the 
“ASEANTOM Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network” in order to examine 
the amount of radiation in the region. The meeting also assigned the OAP to work 
on the related documents and processes as well as to seek support from the 
international organizations such as the IAEA, the European Commission (EC), the 
United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE), and so on. 
 
 To maintain the momentum of the network, the OAP has contributed its own 
financial resources as noted in its operation plans since 2014. Main activities under 
these plans cover (1) the meetings of the working groups (2) annual meeting of the 
ASEANTOM (3) training programs for the other regulatory bodies in the region (4) 
coordination with related stakeholders and circulation of the minutes of the meetings 
to relevant bodies such as the MFA. The expected outcomes as referred to in all plans 
are to “enhance Thailand’s leadership on peaceful use of nuclear.” They also mention 
the leadership in knowledge transfer on nuclear 3S.103 Table 3. offers information on 
the OAP’s budget for the operations of the ASEANTOM. Main objectives are to 
103 OAP, Phǣn Patibat Ratchakān Pračham Pī 2557-2561 [Annual Operation Plans 2014-
2018], accessed May 26, 2019, http://www.oap.go.th/about-us/policy. 
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support the annual meeting of the ASEANTOM and to improve technical and 
personal capacity of ASEAN personnel. Although there is a tendency of decreasing 
the amount of budget, it is still high compared to other projects in the same plans.  
 
Table 3. OAP’s budget for the operations of the ASEANTOM104 
 
Year Amount (approximately in US Dollar)105 
2014 108,508 
Objectives: ASEANTOM Annual meeting, technical 
workshops for ASEAN personnel 
2015 85,361 
Objectives: Meetings with national liaison officers and project 
counter parts, technical workshops for ASEAN personnel 
2016 47,259 
Objectives: Meetings of the working groups, academic 
networking events, international cooperation with regulatory 
bodies on 3S, hosting the ASEAN environmental network 
meeting 
2017 47,256 
Objectives: Hosting the ASEAN environmental network 
meeting, academic cooperation with the IAEA, ASEANTOM 
annual meeting 
2018 35,684 




105 This amount is calculated by the currency converter created by OANDA Corporation 
from the exchange rate of Thai baht (THB) to US Dollar (USD) on May 26, 2019. 
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 In addition to the advocacy to ASEANTOM, the OAP also provides its own 
financial support for establishing the ASEAN Environmental Radiation Monitoring 
Center and the ASEAN Environmental Radiation Data Center following to the 
conclusion of the ASEANTOM annual meeting in 2014. Expected amount of budget 
for the whole project is 1,188,040 US Dollar from 2016 to 2018. 106  The 
establishment of these two centers is significant to ASEAN, particularly the 
readiness for the building of nuclear power plant by any member states in the future. 
All member countries realize that any nuclear emergency or disaster can affect the 
whole region. They also recall the case of Chernobyl Accident and the Fukushima 
Accident as possible worst case scenarios.107 All of these actions are sufficient to 
conclude that Thailand’s leadership has been vital to the establishment and 
development of the ASEANTOM at the initial step. 
 
 2-2-2. Global and regional norms 
 
 This sub-section explores the consequences of global and regional norms on 
the establishment and development of the ASEANTOM in three ways. First of all, 
the author agrees with Dalpino and Westmeyer’s argument that ASEAN countries 
had been moving toward the Globalist view on the nuclear issues in the areas of non-
proliferation and energy. The Globalist view here refers to the shift of the country to 
accede to the existing global agreements and mechanisms as well as to be an active 
member those regimes. ASEAN had committed to several global platforms a long 
time ago, even before the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011. Most of ASEAN 
countries endorsed the principal global treaties and agreements such as NPT and 
CTBT during the Cold War. These treaties lays the groundwork for their members 
106 OAP, Phǣn Patibat Ratchakān Pračham Pī 2559 [Annual Operation Plan 2016], 
a cce sse d  M ay 2 6 ,  2 0 1 9 ,  h t t p : / /www.o ap . go . th / imag es / d o c ume nt s / ab o ut -
us/policy/sp2559.pdf, 68. 
107 OAP, Phaen Patibat Ratchakan, 51-52. 
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to reinforce nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of 
nuclear energy as well as to totally ban the test of nuclear weapons.108 
 
 All ASEAN countries have been the parties of the IAEA since 1960s-1970s. 
Cambodia and Laos attended in 2009 and 2011 consecutively while Brunei is the 
latest comer as it registered in 2014. According to the Article 2 and 3 of the Statute, 
the IAEA was established to expand the peaceful use of atomic energy, particularly 
for health and prosperity. The Statute also noted the prohibition of any uses for 
military purpose. Its main functions are to ensure correct purpose of nuclear use by 
managing safeguards, promote research activities and exchange of information and 
personnel in related areas, cooperate with the UN specialized agencies, and so on.109 
Complementing to the membership, ASEAN countries have committed to many 
provisions on nuclear 3s under the IAEA, including the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement (CSA), the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), and the Convention on 
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Table 4. outlines the global commitment 
of ASEAN countries by the time of establishing the ASEANTOM. 
 
Table 4. ASEAN commitment to the global regimes on nuclear governance by 
















n on Early 
Notificatio
n 
Brunei Darussalam       
Cambodia       
108 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 138-139. 
109  “ T h e  S t a t u t e  o f  t h e  I A E A , ”  I A E A ,  a c c e s s e d  M a y  2 6 ,  2 0 1 9 , 
https://www.iaea.org/about/statute#a1-3. 
110 Adapted from Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 138-139. 
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Indonesia       
Lao PDR       
Malaysia       
Myanmar       
The Philippines       
Singapore       
Thailand       
Viet Nam       
 
 Second, although ASEAN had been moving toward the Globalist 
perspective on nuclear energy, its direction also framed by collective regional norms, 
particularly the concept of 4Cs111 and the concept of “ASEAN Way.” The author 
agrees with Wan’s analysis that economic regionalism and ASEAN identity had 
played an essential role in determining the characters of regional nuclear order and 
institutions. These factors define the scope of nuclear issues to be discussed in the 
region and its modalities on how to work together to address and solve the problems. 
ASEAN’s focus on economic regionalism reoriented its interest from “hard security” 
to softer issues. At the same time, ASEAN had been seeking its greater role in East 
Asian and Asia-Pacific region such as the APT and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC).112 
 
 However, this glance for greater status enmeshed ASEAN in the politics of 
great power competition. As Wan pointed out, the struggle between the two 
superpowers framed the nuclear issues in ASEAN to be only nuclear safety and 
security. Also, ASEAN countries would prefer to talk about the regional cooperation 
on civilian use of nuclear energy rather than strong sense of nuclear governance 
within and beyond the region. Wan further explained the nuclear issues in ASEAN 
111 4Cs comprise Community, Connectivity, Centrality, and Charter. 
112 Wan, Regional Pathways, 87-88. 
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by indicating that the basic ideas of regional cooperation on these topics were mainly 
based on the remaining challenge of SEANWFZ, which is the endorsement of NWS. 
However, the SEANWFZ itself was not a complete functioning regional 
organization as it lacks of “the unassembled or partly assembled forms” and the 
secretariat. The emphasis of national sovereignty, according to Wan, undermined the 
provision of the zone in practice.113 
 
 At the first stage of the establishment of the ASEANTOM, the concept of 
ASEAN Community and Connectivity played a very important role. First of all, the 
awareness of the ASEAN Community provided a conducive environment for further 
cooperation on any issues. Thailand grasped an opportunity to propose this idea to 
the region right after the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. According to the author’s 
informal discussion with an executive of the OAP, the context of ASEAN 
Community accounted as a core push factor for successful establishment. The two 
key documents, the establishment of the ASEANTOM and the Annual Operation 
Plans, also stressed on the principles and practices of ASEAN Community and 
Connectivity. According to an informal discussion with an executive at the OAP, the 
realization of inter-governmental characteristic decided the form of this institution 
to be a “network” rather than a “legally binding organization” or a “supranational 
governance” like the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in Europe. 
Wan also shared similar argument that the context of ASEAN Community was 
relevant.114 
 
 On the concept of ASEAN centrality, Emmers pointed out that the concept 
had evolved over time with different emphasis. During the Cold War, the ASEAN 
centrality was mainly about ASEAN autonomy in managing the external relations 
with superpowers. After the Cold War, the concept evolved into the “impartiality in 
113 Wan, Regional Pathways, 89. 
114 Wan, Regional Pathways, 91. 
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multipolar structure.” The security environment in the Post-Cold War period has 
changed with the rise of China in terms of military and economic power, especially 
the South China Sea Disputes. ASEAN has been attempting to develop an ASEAN-
led regional architecture since the late 1990s. Although there were an emerging 
conflict between great powers in the region, it would not negatively affect ASEAN 
as it had some experiences in the past. The way ASEAN applied this concept to their 
practice was rather from its desire not to choose any side in the conflict.115 The 
application of ASEAN centrality in the case of ASEANTOM is likely to be based on 
autonomy within and beyond. The ASEANTOM is bestowed the authority to 
represent ASEAN in negotiating with other international actors such as the IAEA or 
any other dialogue partners. 
 
 Furthermore, Article 2. of the ASEAN Charter refers to principles of the 
ASEAN Community, so-called the ASEAN Way. It covers the principles of national 
sovereignty, non-intervention, consultation basis, and peaceful dispute settlement. In 
case of the ASEANTOM, these principles truly influence the determination of 
structures and modalities on how the ASEANTOM works. As aforementioned, 
ASEAN, as the inter-governmental organization, puts forth national sovereignty 
over intra-regional power. This is why the ASEANTOM was designed as a platform 
for national organizations on nuclear governance rather than a supra-national 
mechanism. In addition, the summary report of the First Meeting of the 
ASEANTOM noted some terms they agreed to use such as the word of “ASEAN 
Member States” to insist in the principle of national sovereignty. The participants 
also concurred on the principle of “national willingness” to identify the action plans 
and other related activities of the network.116 
115 Ralf Emmers, “Unpacking ASEAN Neutrality: The Quest for Autonomy and Impartiality 
in Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 3 (2018), 362-365. 
116 “Summary of the 1st Meeting of ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic 





                                                          
 
 2-2-3. Member states’ preferences 
 
 This sub-section reviews the nuclear capabilities in ASEAN countries before 
the establishment of the ASEANTOM in 2013. Capabilities examined in this sub-
section refer to (1) capacity to produce nuclear power (2) balance between sources 
for energy supplies and electricity demand (3) existing nuclear regulatory bodies at 
that time. These components played very important role in shaping the countries’ 
need to go for nuclear power. 
 
 2-2-3-1. Brunei Darussalam 
 
 Brunei Darussalam had sufficient economic resources to produce nuclear 
power due to its high GDP per capita at 26,930 USD in 2006 with small number of 
population. The status of Brunei, although it is small, is an industrialized nation due 
to its technology-led industrial sectors such as oil exports and service industry. 
Brunei had skilled workers to cope with high-level technology. It could also 
“outsource” any problems.117 At the same time, Brunei was rich of oil and gas 
exports, although it is a small country. The amount of extensive oil and natural gas 
reserves was high as it was able to formulate electricity to at least 2030. Realizing 
this potential, Brunei shifted its sources for energy supply from oil to natural gas at 
the rate of 99% of the production. 
 
 Moreover, the equilibrium between electricity production capacities was 
slightly over the consumption. There had been a tendency that its energy demand 
would increase to 3.3 million tons of oil equivalent in 2030. Two key reasons were 
a high urbanization rate and the development of transportation sector in the country. 
The urban development rate of Brunei was anticipated from 75% in 2002 to 75% in 
117 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 30. 
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2030. This rate was still low compared to the others. Brunei’s intention to move 
forward with industrial development, especially transportation sector required a high 
need of energy supplies. This point was problematic to Brunei as its sources of 
electricity production mainly depended upon oil and natural gas reserves.118 This 
trend might affect the consideration to use nuclear energy in the future. 
 
 Brunei did not have any regulatory body on nuclear governance at that time. 
The only one existing national institution was the Brunei Energy Association 
(BEnA). This association was established by its energy companies as a non-profit 
organization in 2002 aiming to promote energy conservation and efficiency in 
general. It once invited the experts from South Korea to talk about the opportunity 
to go nuclear. In September 2007, the spokesperson of the association mentioned 
that the country might not pursue nuclear energy in the near future but it would seek 
a new source for its energy supply to replace the dependence on oil and gas 
reserve.119 After considering these three components, Brunei was ready to proceed 
with nuclear energy. However, it was unlikely that Brunei Darussalam had any 
intention to pursue nuclear energy. Deciding to do so might add additional cost to 
the country. From the author’s opinion, being a member of the ASEANTOM was 
rather benefit than disadvantage. 
 
 2-2-3-2. Cambodia 
 
 In case of Cambodia, it totally lacks of capacity to develop nuclear power 
by itself in all dimensions, including personnel and technology. The war had 
deteriorated the quality of electricity infrastructure. This circumstance influenced the 
country in the form of highest electricity prices within the region. Phnom Penh, the 
capital of Cambodia, counted as 70% electricity consumption of the whole country. 
118 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 16-17. 
119 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 26. 
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The increase in electricity demand in Cambodia mainly derived from its effort to 
industrialize the country. Heavy industries, mostly manufacturing of textiles, 
garment, and shoes, ranked first for electricity consumption. As the location where 
Cambodian people lived was not in big town, it was likely that there was no need to 
pursue a nuclear power plant to meet its energy demands.120 Furthermore, there were 
many concerns reflected by politicians and environmentalists on the plan to build a 
coal power plant in Sihanoukville. Some of them suggested the government seek 
alternative energy supplies as they were less dangerous to public health.121 
 
 Cambodia did not have any regulatory body as well. The Ministry of 
Industry, Mines, and Energy (MIME) has played a leading role on the country’s 
international cooperation and energy governance in general. The National Assembly 
passed the law on non-proliferation of WMD in October 2007. This law lays the 
groundwork for reinforcing the existing frameworks of the IAEA on nuclear safety 
and security. It totally bans the application, development, transfer of any sorts of 
WMD, including nuclear weapons, biochemical, radioactive, and chemical weapons. 
The enactment of this law was an attempt to underpin the feature on nuclear weapon-
free ASEAN and Cambodia’s commitment toward the global norms on nuclear 
issues. Cambodia wanted to position itself as a country that was not a threat to 
anyone.122 Therefore, its presence in the ASEANTOM would be totally a plus for all 
dimensions, including the advancement of national image and capacity on nuclear 
governance in the country. 
 
 2-2-3-3. Indonesia 
 
120 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 17-18. 
121 Nguon Sovan, “S’ville coal-fired power plant fuels concerns for health, environment,” 
The Phnom Penh Post, May15, 2008, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/sville-
coal-fired-power-plant-fuels-concerns-health-environment. 
122 Xiaodan Du, ed., “Cambodia approves law of non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical 
weapon,” CCTV, October 14, 2009, http://english.cctv.com/20091014/103984.shtml. 
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 Indonesia had a long story of its involvement in nuclear technology with 
kind support under the Atoms for Peace Program during the Cold War. It was not 
difficult for Indonesia to move forward with nuclear development due to its existing 
capacity. The National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) worked closely with the 
IAEA to launch a large number of technical cooperation programs. There were 89 of 
141 programs concerned nuclear energy development. This number marked the 
highest in the region. However, BATAN faced a serious problem of “brain drain.” It 
had to seek for young workforce to replace senior officers. At the same time, once 
the officers had an appropriate level of knowledge and expertise, they might leave 
the organization. According to Somboonpakron, this trend would not negatively 
influence the decision to pursue nuclear energy.123  
 
 More serious problem was an increasingly energy demand. Prasetijo 
assessed the projection of fuel mix for major power systems in Indonesia during 
2010-2019 in the key four areas: Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Jawa-Bali. His 
projection displayed a tendency of higher electricity consumption in each year. 
Alternative sources of energy supplies would not be sufficient to meet the energy 
demands of the Indonesians.124 Simultaneously, traditional sources of electricity 
production such as coal was one of root causes of haze pollution in the region. 
Esterman’s report displayed the amount of fine dust in 2011 that caused Indonesia 
the highest number of premature deaths in the region. This number would be doubled 
by 2030.125 The intention of Indonesia to acquire nuclear power was very clear as it 
issued two laws: Law No. 17/2007 on National Long-term Development Plan 2005-
2019 and Presidential Decree No. 5/2010 on National Mid-term Development Plan 
123 123 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 87. 
124 Prasetijo, “Power Development Plan,” 183. 
125 Isabel Esterman,  “Southeast Asia’s coal boom could cause 70,000 deaths per year by 





                                                          
2010-2014. The latter document indicated a need to “conduct a new feasibility 
studies of nuclear power plants at new sites.”126 
 
 Indonesia had one of the most advanced national institutions and regulations 
related to nuclear energy governance. In addition to BATAN, Indonesia established 
the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) in 1997. This organization 
focuses on the provision of nuclear regulations and harmonization with the global 
and regional commitments. It also directed the policy on licensing and inspection 
systems. 127  On regulations, Indonesia had enacted a number of government 
regulations, presidential decrees, and BAPETEN chairman’s regulations. As a result, 
Indonesia was one of the most advanced country to pursue nuclear energy in the 
region with equipped national regulations and institutions. It also had a number of 
experts and specialists that could be valuable resources for future development and 
decision on nuclear issues. 
 
 2-2-3-4. Lao PDR 
 
 The case of Lao PDR was very similar to the case of Cambodia. The country 
lacked capacity to develop nuclear technology in all dimensions. There was a small 
need for electricity consumption as Laos had small number of population growth, 
industrialization, and urbanization. According to Somboonpakron, 80% of Laotian 
people were in the agricultural sector, especially rice farming. Its main industries 
were mining and hydroelectric power export. The latter accounted for 30% of its 
GDP revenue. It was anticipated that the domestic electricity demand would not 
accelerate tremendously.128 Laos is the only one land-locked country in ASEAN. 
However, it attempted to turn this challenge to benefit by positioning itself as a land-
126 Prasetijo, “Power Development Plan,” 185. 
127 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, (Jakarta: 
ASEAN Centre for Energy, 2018), 22. 
128 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 19-20. 
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linked country in order to attract more investment, tourist arrivals, and demands for 
exports. 129  The participation of Laos in the ASEANTOM would increase its 
involvement within the region and enhance its capacity because the Department of 
Science, Ministry of Science and Technology had been the only national entity for 
nuclear energy governance. Being a member of the network could narrow the 
institutional development and perception gap between Laos and the other members 
in term of nuclear energy governance. 
 
 2-2-3-5. Malaysia 
 
 Malaysia was close to Indonesia in terms of the capacity to develop nuclear 
technology by itself given a number of technical cooperation programs and the talent 
of the working officers under the Ministry of Science and Technology. The number 
of 42 of 94 projects in collaboration with the IAEA related to nuclear energy. 
However, the problem of brain drain was not that serious in case of Malaysia. The 
country has been a leading country for the development of science, technology, and 
innovation. The Ministry played a role as a pool of talented people. Nuclear 
Malaysia, a sub-agency, was established to “promote nuclear technology for industry 
and for energy production” as well as training programs to improve the capabilities 
of its personnel. With a large number of talented scientists, engineers, and technical 
administrators, it was possible for Malaysia to have its own nuclear energy 
technology.130  
 
 The trends of increasing electricity demand for Malaysia was similar to other 
countries. Main resources of energy supplies in Malaysia derived from natural gas 
and crude oil (96.3% of energy production). At the same time, Malaysia exported its 
129 Gretchen A. Kunze, and V. Bruce J. Tolentino, “In Laos: Land-Linked not Land-Locked,” 
The Asia Foundation, August 27, 2008, https://asiafoundation.org/2008/08/27/in-laos-land-
linked-not-land-locked/. 
130 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 60-61. 
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crude oil and oil products. The two main sectors highly consumed the energy were 
industrial and transportation sectors. Besides, the amount of electricity consumption 
in Malaysia originated from commercial, residential, and agricultural sectors.131 In 
the long run, the energy demand would be high but the case of Malaysia was quite 
different because it was planning to move forward the New Economic Model in 
2010, aiming at the achievement of a high income status country. Malaysia expressed 
its intention to move toward tertiary industry, which enabled clean energy 
technology to play more active role in national development. However, there could 
be one situation that both natural gas and coal replaced oil supply for electricity 
production.132 
 
 The existing Malaysia’s national nuclear energy governance at that time was 
very comprehensive. It set three main milestones for nuclear power development, 
covering raising awareness, negotiating the contracts, and operating the first nuclear 
power plant. Malaysia issued the Atomic Energy Licensing Act in 1984. This Act 
provides a comprehensive provision of nuclear energy-related activities. In addition 
to this Act, Malaysia had a number of institutions and set of rules for nuclear 
operation in the country: the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB), Department 
of Occupational Safety and Health, Department of Environment, and Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government. 133 As seen from these organizations, Malaysia 
deemed the construction of a nuclear power plant in multi-dimensional rather than 
technical ways. As a result, the presence of Malaysia in the network would probably 
not affect the country directly as it had much valuable resources. It could proceed 
with nuclear technology development by itself. 
 
 2-2-3-6. Myanmar 
131 Chinhao Chong, Weidou Ni, Linwei Ma, Pei Liu and Zheng Li, “The Use of Energy in 
Malaysia: Tracing Energy Flows from Primary Source to End Use,” Energies 8(2015): 
2843. 
132 Chong et al., “The Use of Energy in Malaysia,” 2847, 2853. 
133 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, 7. 
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 Myanmar during the military government was rich of capital from exporting 
its natural resources such as oil and gas to its neighboring and Asian countries. 
Furthermore, it had abundant agricultural and mining resources, accounted for 43% 
of its export. Myanmar once lacked its ability to advance its 15% payment for 
building a nuclear research reactor. However, it could mobilize financial resources 
to pay the rest of the amount as the military government had full authority for 
resource mobilization. Besides, there were some evidences that Myanmar gained 
some support from foreign countries such as Russia and China to develop talented 
workers to work for nuclear energy programs.134 Tun referred to some researchers’ 
opinions that Myanmar had already established some nuclear facilities such as 
reactors and enrichment facilities. Also, some observers expressed their concerns 
that Myanmar might acquire some advanced nuclear technology from its North 
Korean counterpart. However, this information was not proven true.135 
 
 Myanmar had a balance between energy supplies and electricity demand as 
it was rich of natural resources. The capacity to afford electricity was higher than 
consumption. Myanmar positioned itself to be an exporter of electricity. It 
constructed a new infrastructure for generation and distribution in 2006. Two years 
later, Myanmar’s general capacity accelerated. Its supply was over demand at 658.7 
Megawatt, which was high compared to other ASEAN countries. Apart from main 
resources such as oil and gas, Myanmar was also rich of its hydropower and 
geothermal steam due to its geography. It had at least twenty-nine dam projects under 
construction with India, China, and Thailand.136 However, Myanmar encountered 
many blackouts because of its technical failures such as cleavages in transmission 
yards, lines, and power plants. Other problems originated from natural conditions, 
134 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 55-56. 
135 Thaung Tun, “Myanmar and the Nuclear Option,” in Asia’s Energy Trends and 
Developments Volume 1: Innovations and Alternative Energy Supplies eds. Mark Hong and 
Amy Lugg (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), 270. 
136 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 42-43, 46-47. 
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including storms, strong winds, high temperatures, and lightning strikes. The system 
breakdowns occurred twelve times in 2011 and fourteen times in 2012.137 
 
 Myanmar expressed its interest in nuclear energy since 1956. The country 
founded the Atomic Energy Centre under the Union of Burma Applied Research 
Institute. The objectives of this institute were to develop capacity of its scientists. 
Later, Myanmar acceded the membership of the IAEA. Myanmar and the IAEA co-
created the programs for in nuclear science for agriculture and medicine. In mid-
1970s, they operated a small neutron generator at Rangoon University. The 
acquisition of nuclear energy was prioritized by the military government in 1988 to 
be a “national debate.” However, the IAEA rejected Myanmar’s request asking for 
assistance to develop the research reactor because it had “no confidence” in 
Myanmar’s elites. Therefore, Myanmar was looking for partners such as Russia and 
China to pursue its goal. It was likely that Myanmar had a very positive view toward 
nuclear energy. Nuclear energy was referred as “desirable for the long-term.” 
However, the country shifted its stance in 2009 as the Ministry of Energy defined 
nuclear energy as an environmental risk.138 
 
 2-2-3-7. The Philippines 
 
 The Philippines had sufficient financial resources to finish its nuclear power 
plant. In 2009, the Philippines finalized the payment to Westinghouse, a nuclear 
power plant construction company. Before the establishment of the ASEANTOM, 
there appeared a rising trend of economic development, similar to the other ASEAN 
countries. Main sources of Philippine capital derived from high government 
spending, a strong service sector, and remittances of Filipinos living abroad. 
However, the Philippines spent a lot of money to complete the construction of its 
137 Aung Shin, “The truth behind the blackouts,” Myanmar Times,  May 6, 2016, 
https://www.mmtimes.com/business/20167-the-truth-behind-the-blackouts.html. 
138 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 132. 
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famous but unused nuclear power plant, Bataan. There was also suspicion over the 
issue of corruption and nepotism by exploiting unskilled labors to skim money from 
the project. The Philippines should have sufficient skilled labors to work for a 
nuclear program if it decided to go that way because the country was industrialized 
with diverse expertise from high-skilled industries. On its technical capacity, the 
Philippines was supported by the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The 
country also participated in a number of joint technical cooperation projects with the 
IAEA. The number of programs ranked second following to Indonesia.139 
 
 The supply side of energy in the Philippines was higher than demand side at 
10%. Its principal sources were coal, natural gas, and hydropower consecutively. 
Coal was accounted 40% of is electricity production. The country was highly 
dependent on coal. Thus, it required an import of coal for maintaining energy 
security in electricity. However, the Philippines might not be possible to afford the 
rising coal price in the world market in 2008. Two sources were identified: 
geothermal and hydropower but the capacity of electricity production from these two 
sources was still low. The combination of these two sources could not afford a sharp 
rise in electricity demand.140 Residential sector, particularly the usage in Manila 
Metropolitan Area, was the most important electricity consumer followed by 
commercial and industrial sectors. An additional component of energy consumption 
was from the urbanization. There was an expectation that the urbanization rate would 
increase from 60% in 2002 to 76% in 2030. Following to this, there would be an 
increasing demand for electricity as well. This situation affected the government’s 
decision on nuclear energy. The policy reoriented its direction when the government 
changed.141 
 
139 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 57-58, 61. 
140 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 48-49. 
141 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 44-45. 
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 The Philippines established the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC), which evolved into the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI). This 
institute has been the only one regulatory body of the country under the Department 
of Science and Technology. It has several mandates and responsibilities such as 
research and development activities on the application and technical issues related 
to radiation and nuclear techniques, supervision nuclear research reactors and other 
facilities, regulation of nuclear and radiation-related activities and export-import 
control, and so on.142 However, this institute was not a sole organization in the 
country. There was a coordination between the institute and other related entities 
such as the National Power Corporation under the Department of Energy and the 
IAEA. The Philippines issues the Republic Act 2067 in 1958 to lay the groundwork 
for national regulations on nuclear safety.143 
 
 2-2-3-8. Singapore 
 
 Singapore had a high amount of capital and high-skilled labors for its 
advanced industrial sectors such as oil refinement and consumer electronics. 
Electricity demand in Singapore was anticipated to reach at eighteen Gigawatt by 
2030. The usage of electricity in Singapore mainly derived from residential and 
commercial sectors. The population was growing larger and requiring for a high 
standard of living. For commercial sector, Singapore positioned itself as a financial 
and logistics hub. This characteristic of commercial sector required a big amount of 
electricity demand. Considering the supply side, Singapore did not have any sources 
of alternative energy. It imported a large number of natural gas from Malaysia and 
Indonesia.144 
 
142 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, 25-26. 
143 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, 13. 
144 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 20-21, 24-25, 31. 
60 
 
                                                          
 The Radiation Protection and Nuclear Science Department (RPNSD) has 
been the key regulatory body of the country. This entity was established under the 
National Environment Agency (NEA). Singapore enacted three regulations 
regarding the provision of nuclear 3s. They are Radiation Protection Regulations 
governing three different aspects: Non-ionizing radiation, ionizing radiation, and 
transport of radioactive materials. Although Singapore was rich of human and 
technological resources, it had an intention to not pursue the nuclear energy.  Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong once considered nuclear as a necessary option in 2010 
and assigned the Energy Studies Institute at National University of Singapore to 
conduct a feasibility studies. The results stated that there would be higher risks than 
benefits given Singapore’s geography. Singapore would not be ready for any 
emergency cases.145  
 
 2-2-3-9. Thailand 
 
 Thailand involved in the development of nuclear technology since the Cold 
War. Similar to some ASEAN countries, Thailand received technical and financial 
support from the Atoms for Peace Program and the IAEA. At first, it focused more 
on medical objectives and agriculture. Thailand participated in one hundred and six 
projects in total. Approximately fifty of them concerned nuclear energy 
development.146 There was a great electricity demand based on Thailand’s economic 
development and urbanization. One key reason for Thailand to acquire nuclear 
energy was its reliance on energy sources from neighboring countries. This situation 
affected the status of nuclear security in the country. However, more than 83% 
disagreed the building of a nuclear power plant as they witnessed the unintended 
consequences of the Fukushima Accident.147 
 
145 Dalpino and Westmeyer, “Southeast Asia,” 130. 
146 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 88-89. 
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 Thailand established the Thai Atomic Energy Commission (Thai AEC) as 
its national regulatory body following the Atomic Energy for Peace Act in 1961. The 
OAP, which played a key role as leader in establishing the ASEANTOM, has been 
a secretariat of this national commission. Adding to the Act in 1961, Thailand issued 
the Ministerial Regulations on the practices of licensing and implementation of 
nuclear materials and its by-products. Apart from founding the ASEANTOM, the 
OAP has been a leading entity in announcing guidance, ordinance, and procedures 
to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and to enact the international practices 
formulated by the IAEA at the national level. Thailand has ensured its commitment 
to the principle of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear 3s.148 
 
 2-2-3-10. Viet Nam 
 
 The history of nuclear presence in Viet Nam can be traced back to the Cold 
War. The United States supported South Viet Nam to construct the Da Lat Research 
Reactor in 1963 under the Atoms for Peace Program. Later, this reactor was 
supported by Soviet fuel and assistance. Viet Nam co-worked with the IAEA in 
several projects since 1971. At the first place, Viet Nam’s nuclear program focused 
on the medical applications and agriculture. Among total number of ninety-five 
projects, more than half of them related to nuclear energy. Although Viet Nam was 
a very active country to pursue nuclear energy, it encountered the same problems as 
many countries on shortage of human resources.149 Although Viet Nam was one of 
the most active country to acquire nuclear power, it had several debates internally 
(1) whether nuclear power would be the cheapest energy (2) whether existing 
measures would be sufficient to tackle nuclear safety issue (3) whether Viet Nam 
would gain confidence from the international community.150 
 
148 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, 14-15. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Yarr and Nguyễn, “Vietnam,” 168, 169-170, 174. 
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 Viet Nam had the highest rate of electricity demand around 7.8% which 
accounted as the highest in the region. It was anticipated that Viet Nam would shift 
its trend from net exporter to importer of energy by 2020. Two main reasons behind 
this shift were rapid industrialization and growth in service and industrial sectors. 
This trend would be growing up in the future as the country was becoming richer. 
Considering from supply side, the main source of electricity derived from 
hydropower from the Northern part of the country. It accounted 62% of the whole 
energy portfolio, followed by oil and gas. Hydropower was not reliable due to 
uncertain natural conditions such as seasonal effects and droughts. This situation 
enabled Viet Nam to pursue nuclear power and import additional energy sources 
from its neighboring countries such as China, Laos, and Cambodia.151 However, Viet 
Nam was one of claimant states in the South China Sea issues. This situation might 
obstruct their bilateral cooperation. 
 
 Viet Nam’s nuclear energy program had been running under rigid control of 
political and bureaucratic entities. Given the nature of socialist characteristic, the 
policy on nuclear energy was top-down under the supervision of the Politburo. The 
Politburo has an authority to disseminate, generate, and endorse nuclear energy 
policies, national goals, and specific projects. There are various actors in the policy 
process on the basis of consensus. On the national mechanisms, Viet Nam 
established a number of entities under the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
Those mechanisms include the Viet Nam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC), the 
Viet Nam Atomic Energy Agency (VAEA), and the National Nuclear Safety Council 
(NNSC). The previous two organizations have been under the Ministry of Science 
and Technology, aiming to conduct research to support the application and 
development of activities for nuclear energy. While the NNSC has been rather a 
coordinating body of related ministries.152 Viet Nam had enacted twenty eight laws 
151 Somboonpakron, Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia, 74-75, 78-79. 
152 Yarr and Nguyễn, “Vietnam,” 165-166. 
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and regulations on nuclear safety and security from 1996-2011. 153  For the 
ASEANTOM, the Viet Nam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS) 
has served as the national focal point. 
 
 2-2-3-11. ASEAN member state’s preferences 
 
 After reviewing the situation in each country before the establishment of the 
ASEANTOM in 2012, the author sees some gaps in ASEAN capabilities to pursue 
the ASEANTOM. There is a general trend that some ASEAN countries, who had 
high level of capital and high-skilled workers together with a dire need in electricity 
demand, had a tendency to pursue nuclear energy. It is likely that electricity demand 
was a key driver of the motivation toward nuclear power. At the same time, the 
national regulatory body and frameworks had already existed at that time. Some 
countries were more advanced than the others as they enacted several laws and 
regulations at national and organizational level. Given that the ASEANTOM 
required national willingness as a prerequisite condition for attendance, ASEAN 
member states’ preferences played very important role. It should be noted that being 
a member of the ASEANTOM required no sacrifice of resources. This justification 
was also relevant to favorability of ASEAN countries toward the establishment of 
the network. Table 5. reviews ASEAN member states’ preferences to attend the 
ASEANTOM. 
 
Table 5. ASEAN member states’ preferences to attend the ASEANTOM154 
 









153 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, 16-17. 
154 Compiled by the author. 
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2-3. Characterizing the ASEANTOM 
 
 This sub-section discussed the key characteristics of the ASEANTOM as 
influenced by the aforementioned three factors: Thailand’s leadership, global and 
regional norms, and ASEAN member states’ preferences. First of all, the author 
agrees with Dalpino and Westmeyer’s article that ASEAN has been moving toward 
Globalist approach, which refers to ASEAN countries’ commitment toward 
international agreements and mechanisms on nuclear non-proliferation and energy 
issues. At the same time, global norms also lays the groundwork for the operation of 
the ASEANTOM as it includes all regulatory bodies of ASEAN countries. From the 
author’s point of view, the emergence of the ASEANTOM would reinforce the 
diffusion of the global norms and institutions to promote nuclear non-proliferation 
and nuclear 3s. This is because the participants of the ASEANTOM totally agreed 
to employ the network as a single platform working closely with the IAEA. 
According to the Action Plan 2014-2015 of the ASEANTOM, the IAEA was one of 
active attendees who proposed the regional training courses and workshops on 
radiation detection techniques and maintenance of instruments, as well as nuclear 
and radioactive materials transport safety and security.155 
 




                                                          
 Second, although ASEAN has been moving toward Globalist approach, it 
still maintains its regional norms so-called the ASEAN Way restrictively. As 
aforementioned, Thailand employed a great opportunity of the 2011 Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident and the emergence of the ASEAN Community to draw regional 
support from other member countries. The author agrees with Wan that the mandate 
and scope of the ASEANTOM would be different from the EURATOM.156 As the 
executive of the OAP clearly stated, the ASEANTOM would be a “network” rather 
than a supranational organization. This is because ASEAN has worked in the spirit 
of national willingness and respect for national sovereignty. Also, this network 
works on the basis of consultation rather than the formal assignment of duties and 
responsibilities. These features make the participants feel comfortable with the 
platforms. In practice, the division of labor within the network follows the same 
guidelines. Explicitly, the countries who have high capacity for nuclear technology 
such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have been very active in taking 
lead in a number of initiatives while some countries, who are very new to the issues, 
play less important role. However, this does not mean that they are disqualified from 




 This thesis asks three specific questions. Who were the initiators or leaders 
to propose the idea of cooperation and why? How had the activities become a 
function of the cooperation? Why did the ASEANTOM evolve in this way? For the 
first question, it is explicit that Thailand played its important role as a leader in 
setting the agenda and providing platform for further discussion. However, offering 
only platforms was not sufficient to build a consensus among other ASEAN 
countries. Thailand proposed the idea to several channels such as the General 
Meeting of IAEA, the meetings of related ASEAN ministers, and the Nuclear 
156 Wan, Regional Pathways, 92. 
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Security Summit in order to diffuse the idea regionally. Then, it secured the idea by 
providing its own resources to maintain the momentum and maximized the benefit 
of the existing norms and institutions. The ASEANTOM was finally established in 
2012, followed by a series of meetings, workshops, and exchanges. The motivations 
behind Thailand’s leadership might be its involvement in the building of the ASEAN 
Community since 1967 and its national goals for more competitiveness. Figure 2. 
explains the processes leading to the establishment of the ASEANTOM briefly. 
 









 The answer for the second and third questions is simple. The members of 
the ASEANTOM put forward the establishment and development of the network by 
following the 4Cs of ASEAN and the ASEAN Way. Thailand maximized the benefit 
of the emergence of ASEAN Community and the concept of ASEAN Connectivity 
to call for further cooperation with other nuclear regulatory bodies in the region. At 
the same time, the members of the network emphasized the concept of ASEAN 
centrality by insisting the regional interest of ASEAN in the negotiation with 
partners. The last C, which is the ASEAN Charter, reflects in the modalities and 
guidelines on how the network has run. The principles comprise non-intervention, 
respect for national sovereignty, and consultation. These practices also influence the 
determination of the activities and issues discussed within the network. For example, 
main activities of this network are workshops, trainings, and exchanges because the 
member countries are comfortable. They also gain some benefits considering from 
Agenda-setting 
 
Diffusing the idea regionally 
 
Securing the idea 
 




capacity-building approach. Besides, the participants put forth the emergency 
preparedness and radioactive monitoring as the first priority as they realize that these 
measures are necessary for the future. If any nuclear accident taken place in the 
region, other ASEAN countries should be ready to prepare for coping with 
emergency immediately and efficiently. To do so, there should be sufficient technical 
officers and technologies. At the same time, there would be a mobilization of the 
troops to the accidental country. This issue will be very sensitive as it touches upon 
the principle of non-intervention. 
 
2-5. Limitation of research 
 
 The analysis section of this research draws heavily on the role of Thailand’s 
leadership in motivating and managing the network as well as the regional 
documents from Thailand’s side. In the author’s opinion, the current details are 
sufficient to conclude in this way. To explain a comprehensive process of the 
ASEANTOM, the interview of other ASEAN countries’ policymakers will help 
complete the explanation on the whole process of the establishment and development 





1. Policy implications 
 
1-1. Post-2015 regional nuclear order in ASEAN 
 
 Although the objectives of the establishment of the NEC-SSN and the 
ASEANTOM are intentionally different from SEANWFZ, ASEAN will maintain 
the three bodies as principal regional mechanisms for its nuclear order. Principally, 
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ASEAN countries committed by the ASEAN Charter to promote a nuclear free 
ASEAN. Throughout the twenty years of the institutionalization of regional nuclear 
order in ASEAN, the member states have disciplined themselves far from developing 
any nuclear weapons. Although there was a concern over Myanmar’s inclination to 
North Korea, it did not bring about any actions toward the development of nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, the nuclear issue in ASEAN for the next decade would be based 
on the nuclear safety and peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. 
 
 On nuclear non-proliferation issue, the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) initiated the study group on WMD in order to accelerate 
regional awareness on a global issue such as the proliferation of WMD. In 2008, the 
attendees of the ARF meeting concurred on the establishment of the study group on 
WMD to evaluate the threats of proliferation in the region. Emphasizing the needs 
for greater counter-proliferation, the leaders required concrete actions build on the 
UNSC Resolution 1540. The findings conducted by this group were useful to identify 
the loopholes in the NPT and elimination of international black market in nuclear 
materials, components, and know-how. They also address North Korea’s nuclear 
threat as a serious challenge for the non-proliferation in the region. This group had 
hold the meetings for eighteen times from 2005 to 2014.157 
 
 After the works of the study group on WMD being completed in 2014, there 
was a proposal to the missions of the study group with a new focus. NPD Study 
Group was formed with responsibilities to conduct capacity-building programs to 
enhance the implementation of international arrangements to enhance non-
proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technology in the Asia-
Pacific region. The group directly reports its findings from the meetings and studies 
to ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM/NPD). 
157 “Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Asia Pacific,” 




                                                          
NPD Study Group has two different characteristics from WMD Study Group. First 
of all, it focuses on the specific actions toward the solution of the problems rather 
than the identification of threat. Second, it reinforces the works of ARF, ADMM+, 
and APEC by encouraging the nation-states to fully implement and comply with their 
obligations under the international agreements. Table 6. concluded the expected 
outcomes from NPD Study Group. 
 
Table 6. Expected outcomes from NPD Study Group158 
 
Issues Outputs 
Non-proliferation - The improvement of national model on the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 
- The formation of a regional clearing house 
- The improvement of a template for assessing national 
capacity and requirements 
- The improvement of surveys to examine the attitudes 
of states toward non-proliferation instruments and 
controls of strategic trade 
- Searching for the best practices on the 
implementation of the Treaty 
Disarmament - The de-legitimization of nuclear weapons and 
possession 
- The de-emphasis of the use of nuclear weapons in the 
nuclear-armed states 
- The monitoring of the implementation of NPT review 
process 




                                                          
Peaceful use of nuclear 
technology 
- The improvement of a work plan to promote self, 
secure, and proliferation-resistant nuclear governance 
in the region 
- The monitoring of the Nuclear Security Summit 
process 
- The improvement of specific transparency measures 
at both regional and national levels 
- Deeper examination of re-processing and 
enrichment-free zone proposals 
- The improvement of a work plan or action plan for 
newly-established regional organizations such as 
ASEANTOM and ANSN 
 
 At the 11th EAS meeting in 2016, EAS leaders reinforced their support to 
the ongoing international cooperation on non-proliferation, prevention of nuclear 
terrorism, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy at all levels. This matter was re-
emphasized by the EAS Leader’s Statement in 2018. The leaders further called for 
closer cooperation with IAEA and other related international regimes, including 
NPT. The leaders expressed their support to the works of ASEANTOM. Moreover, 
the EAS leaders encouraged the member states to secure the territory from nuclear 
and other radioactive materials. They encouraged the concerned member states to 
diminish HEU in civilian stocks and employ LEU for technical and economic 
purpose where necessary. 
 
 To build on the continuity of ASEAN plan on energy, the ASEAN leaders 
endorsed APAEC 2016-2025. In this plan, there is a project plan on civilian use of 
nuclear energy. The objective of this plan is to further support the works of NEC-
SSN at the regional level. This plan outlined two key achievements of ASEAN works 
to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy from 2010 to 2015: the development of 
courses and workshops for more than one hundred ASEAN senior policymakers with 
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ASEAN dialogue partners such as China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea as well as 
the conduct of the survey reflecting the necessity of nuclear cooperation for each 
country in 2012. This plan underlines three main outcomes for the first phase of 
implementation: the capacity-building for nuclear policymakers, the promotion of 
public awareness toward nuclear energy, and the reinforcement of regional nuclear 
cooperation on nuclear.159 
 
 However, a comprehensive regional governance on nuclear issues in 
ASEAN is still debatable. As explained, the participation of ASEAN countries in the 
global regimes on WMD non-proliferation is voluntary. The member states reserve 
their full autonomy to decide whether to participate or not. Although most ASEAN 
countries have ratified or been a signatory of the global conventions and initiatives, 
the quality of regime participation, such as the submission of reports, is different. At 
the regional level, there are a number of regional mechanisms related to the nuclear 
non-proliferation, safety, and security in ASEAN, which have different priorities. 
For example, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) 
focuses more on the measures to prevent counter-terrorism and extremism in the 
region. 
 
 Furthermore, the study by the ACE outlined five challenges of strengthening 
regional nuclear safety regime in the region. First, the national adoption of nuclear 
safety and security regulations might take time due to complex legislative process of 
each country. Second, there should be a single window system for submitting the 
documents. Third, it is required for each country to develop higher standard to reach 
IAEA standards. Fourth, there might be the issue on conflict of interest as the 
regulatory body of each country is not independent. Finally, there should be effective 
communication and clear authority between the agencies in order to improve the 
159 ACE, ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025, (Jakarta: 
ASEAN Centre for Energy, 2015), 41-43. 
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inter-agency coordination.160 It is exactly the missions and responsibilities of the 
ASEANTOM to narrow these gaps by enhancing the capacity of its members.  
 
1-2. The outward-looking role of ASEAN for nuclear energy 
governance 
 
 There are several works saying that ASEAN could play such a role on the 
North Korea nuclear issue.161 Most of the works emphasize three main reasons why 
ASEAN is the most relevant to deal with North Korea issue: the economic relations 
between ASEAN and North Korea, the principle of neutrality and autonomy of 
ASEAN, and the political experiences that North Korea could learn. Anantasirikiat 
builds on these works and explains why and how ASEAN can be a player under the 
principle of “charm defensive.” The first justification is about North Korea can be a 
future security challenge of ASEAN if ASEAN cannot accommodate it well. Second, 
there are five features make ASEAN special to be a stakeholder: a direct threat from 
North Korea’s missile, ARF as a single platform including all six parties, ASEAN’s 
non-hostile relationship with North Korea, institutional arrangements that could 
socialize North Korea, and North Korea’s look at some ASEAN countries as an 
example for its economic and political development. 162  Table 7. notes the 
establishment of diplomatic relationship between ASEAN and the two Koreas. 
160 ACE, Study on the Nuclear Legal and Regulatory Framework in ASEAN, 47. 
161 See Shawn Ho and Srarah Teo, “Strengthening ASEAN-US Relations: Korean Peninsula 
as Conduit?,” RSIS Commentary No. 083, May 2, 2017, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/rsis/co17083-strengthening-asean-us-relations-korean-peninsula-as-
conduit/#.XOqMeXmJjIU; Liang Tuang Nah, “ASEAN and North Korea’s Nuclear and 
Missile Programs,” North Korean Review 13, no. 2 (2017): 66-73; Rodolfo C. Severino, “A 
new ASEAN approach to the Korean Peninsula?,” East Asia Forum, November 23, 2013, 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/11/23/a-new-asean-approach-to-the-korean-peninsula/; 
Erwin T. Tan, Geetha Govindasamy, and Chang Kyoo Park, “The Potential Role of South-
East Asia in North Korea’s Economic Reforms: The Cases on ASEAN, Vietnam and 
Singapore,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 52, no. 2 (2017): 172-187. 
162 Seksan Anantasirikiat, “Rationalizing ASEAN’s Charm Defensive Approach on North 




                                                          
 
Table 7. The establishment of diplomatic relationship between ASEAN and the 
two Koreas163 
 
Country South Korea North Korea 
Brunei Darussalam 1984 1999 
Cambodia 1997 1964 
Indonesia 1973 1964 
Lao PDR 1995 1973 
Malaysia 1960 1974 
Myanmar 1975 1975 
The Philippines 1949 2000 
Singapore 1975 1975 
Thailand 1958 1975 
Viet Nam 1992 1950 
 
 Furthermore, ASEAN does not have any sense of balancing between two 
sides. Its diplomatic style is unique – welcoming all, threatening none. This principle 
is also well-adapted to the case of the two Koreas. All ASEAN countries having 
diplomatic relationship with both South Korea and North Korea. The embassies of 
North Korea and South Korea present in the capital of eight member countries, 
except Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines, while five countries opened the 
embassy in Pyongyang. From my perspective, there is no reason for ASEAN to play 
North Korea card with South Korea or other way around. ASEAN itself is attractive 
due to its strategic location as well as the attributes of each member. 
 
 ASEAN has been satisfied of a peaceful co-existence between the two 
Koreas. The Korean peninsula is a flashpoint of Asian regional security. Whatever 
163 Compiled by the author. 
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happens on the peninsula could influence the whole Southeast Asian region. From 
my perspective, this is the right time to formulate an ASEAN approach on the Korean 
peninsula issue. I propose the concept of charm defensive, which refers to a limited 
but constructive role of ASEAN. What ASEAN could do is to maintain its centrality 
in promoting South-North engagement via what I called “ASEAN+2 Security 
Community Initiative.” This initiative is not to set up a new mechanism but to 
maximize the benefit of the existing ASEAN agreements and platforms including 
ASEAN-led regional mechanisms e.g. ARF, TAC, and SEANWFZ. 
 
 Not only regional institutions but also each individual ASEAN country can 
contribute to the stability of the peninsula. ASEAN countries should invite North 
Korean diplomats and policymakers to learn about our path on political and 
economic development without nuclear weapons. North Korean leader, Kim Jong 
Un, witnessed the glory of Singapore through his eyes during the historic summit 
with President Trump in June 2018. Although the role and position of ASEAN in 
inter-Korean relations is limited, some special characteristics that only ASEAN 
possesses might be useful for fostering relations between the two Koreas. 
 
2. Suggestions for future research 
 
 The author would suggest two ways to build on this work. First is the 
identification of a new set of independent variables as an analytical framework for 
regional cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation, safety, and security. This author 
thinks that it is possible to use regional institution as a dependent variable. Region 
here can be defined as an establishment or a path toward regional nuclear order. In 
case of ASEAN, the willingness of member states is required due to the specific 
characteristic of ASEAN as an inter-governmental organization. Therefore, further 
comparative analysis with different groundwork of comparison or different regions 
can enhance the dissemination on regional pathways to nuclear non-proliferation, 




 Second, this work can be a case study of institutional development of 
ASEAN. The author would suggest a comparative analysis across cases and time 
with other regional mechanisms. A new work should also focus more on other 
dimensions such as the influence of ASEAN dialogue partners on the decision or 
formation of states’ preferences and willingness to advance regional development. 
Also, theoretical approach might be an interesting framework to approach nuclear 
non-proliferation in ASEAN. One can explore the case by fully applying the rigorous 
realist or constructivist framework. A comprehensive book on the development of 





 The nuclear issue is not new for ASEAN countries. At the global level, 
almost all ASEAN countries ratified and acceded to the NPT during 1970s-1980s. 
In addition to the NPT, most of them have been the parties of several global nuclear 
regimes, including the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention, and so on. At the national level, ASEAN countries 
had records of nuclear-related activities since 1960s. Four ASEAN countries 
consisting of Thailand, Viet Nam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, operated their 
nuclear research reactors. Among these four countries, the Philippines was the only 
one having plan to construct a nuclear power plant. However, it had to prolong the 
plan for two times due to concerns over nuclear safety and security after the Three 
Mile Island Nuclear Accident in 1979 and the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident in 1986. 
The consequence is similar when there was the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 
2011. ASEAN countries decided to delay their plans and set up the first regional 





 In 2011, ASEAN discussed the idea of creating a regional entity to reinforce 
nuclear 3s in the region as a response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in March. 
The OAP arranged the international conference to celebrate its own golden jubilee 
to assess the situation of nuclear energy in ASEAN as well as to collect some policy 
recommendations from other countries. The senior officials related to the issue 
drafted the concept paper in 2012. The Prime Minister of Thailand at that time 
proposed the idea to the 20th ASEAN Summit with positive responses from other 
member countries. The officials disseminated the Term of References for one year 
(2012-2013). The First Annual Meeting of ASEANTOM took place in 2013 with the 
main objective to formulate the work plan of the network. Although ASEAN has an 
impressive record toward a consolidating regional organization, the analysis on the 
creation of regional nuclear energy governance is rarely examined. This research, 
therefore, explores the formulation of regional governance on nuclear energy in 
ASEAN, particularly the ASEANTOM. 
 
 The author found that the ASEANTOM took place based on the three 
factors: Thailand’s leadership, global and regional norms, and ASEAN member 
countries’ preferences. First of all, Thailand played its role as a leader to initiate this 
initiative due to its motivations of being an active promoter of ASEAN since the 
inception and the opportunity of working with other countries. Second, global and 
regional norms framed the scope and mandate of the network as ASEAN members 
had committed to those existing institutions and frameworks. Finally, ASEAN 
countries were favorable to attend the network as it could fulfill the gaps they had, 
including capacity to acquire nuclear power, balance between electricity demand and 
energy supplies, and the existing national regulatory bodies and frameworks. This 
research also complements the existing explanation by arguing that ASEAN has been 
taking a Globalist approach, which refers to ASEAN’s preferences toward global 
norms on nuclear non-proliferation and energy issues. At the end of thesis, the author 
suggests two interesting topics for future research: the study on institutional design 
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of nuclear governance at the regional level and the comparative analysis of across 
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